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  Mandatory convertibles, which are equity-linked hybrid securities that automatically convert to 
common stock on a pre-specified date, have become an increasingly popular means of raising capital in 
recent years (about $20 billion worth issued in 2001 alone). This paper presents the first theoretical and 
empirical analysis of mandatory convertibles in the literature. We consider a firm facing a financial market 
characterized by asymmetric information, and significant costs in the event of financial distress. The firm 
can raise capital either by issuing mandatory convertibles, or by issuing more conventional securities like 
straight debt, common stock, and ordinary convertibles. We show that, in equilibrium, the firm issues 
straight debt, ordinary convertibles, or equity if the extent of asymmetric information facing it is large, but 
the probability of being in financial distress is relatively small; it issues mandatory convertibles if it faces a 
smaller extent of asymmetric information but a greater probability of financial distress. Our model provides a 
rationale for the three commonly observed features of mandatory convertibles: mandatory conversion, 
capped (or limited) capital appreciation, and a higher dividend yield compared to common stock. We also 
characterize the equilibrium design of mandatory convertibles. Our model also has implications for the 
abnormal stock returns upon the announcement of mandatory convertibles and for the post-issue operating 
performance of mandatory convertible issuers. We test the implications of our theory using a sample of firms 
which have chosen to issue either mandatory convertibles or ordinary convertibles, and we also study the 
long-term abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers. The evidence supports the 
implications of our theory. Why Issue Mandatory Convertibles? Theory and Empirical
Evidence
“ The past two decades have witnessed an explosion of ﬁnancial innovations.... Along with
these changes has come an enormous increase in the demand for the services of ﬁnancial econo-
mists. We are called upon not only to value these new instruments and new strategies, but to
design them as well. Like engineers who use physics, ﬁnancial engineers use the techniques of
modern ﬁnance to build the ﬁnancial equivalent of bridges and airplanes. Unfortunately, though,
when asked to explain why all of this is happening, and why it takes the forms it does, our answers
are much more timid. Not uncommonly, we fall back on old canards such as ‘spanning.’ ”
– Stephen Ross, Presidential Address to the American Finance Association, 1989.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Mandatory convertibles are equity-linked hybrid securities such as PERCS (Preferred Equity Redemp-
tion Cumulative Stock) or DECS (Debt Exchangeable for Common Stock, or Dividend Enhanced Convertible
Securities), which automatically (”mandatorily”) convert to common stock on a pre-speciﬁed date. Starting
from small beginnings in 1988, such mandatory convertibles have become extremely popular in recent times:
$5 billion worth of mandatory convertibles were issued in 1996 (a quarter of the convertible market); in
2001, about $20 billion worth of mandatory convertibles were issued (about 18% of the convertible mar-
ket). Mandatory convertibles have been designed with a variety of payoﬀ structures, and carry diﬀerent
names depending on their payoﬀ structure and the investment bank underwriting their issue: examples are
Morgan Stanley’s PERCS and PEPS, Merrill Lynch’s PRIDES, Salomon Brothers’ DECS, and Goldman
Sach’s ACES. They have been issued by a number of companies, large and small, to raise capital: these
include Texas Instruments, General Motors, Citicorp, Sears, Kaiser Aluminium, Reynolds Metals, American
Express, First Chicago, Boise Cascade, and All State. Two recent issuers were AT&T and Motorola, which
raised $900 million and $1.2 billion, respectively, in 2001 by selling mandatory convertibles.
Even though there are diﬀerences among the above mentioned variations of mandatory convertibles in
their payoﬀ structures as well as in some other provisions, certain fundamental features are common to all
of them. Three such features are as follows. First, as discussed above, conversion to equity is mandatory
1at the maturity of the convertible (as against conversion to equity at the option of the security holder in
the case of ordinary convertibles). Second, the dividend yield on a mandatory convertible is typically higher
than that on the underlying common stock. Third, mandatory convertibles have either a capped or limited
appreciation potential compared to the underlying common stock.
It is useful to illustrate the above three features using two examples. The ﬁrst example illustrates an
issue of PERCS. In September 1991, K-Mart Corporation issued $1.012 billion worth of PERCS at $44.00
(K-Mart stock was also selling at this price on the day of issue). The PERCS paid a dividend of 7.75%,
while K-Mart’s common stock was paying a dividend of only 4% at this time. Each unit of PERCS was
mandatorily convertible to one share of K-Mart common stock on September 15, 1994, subject to a cap of
$57.20: i.e., if the share price of K-Mart exceeded $57.20, each unit of PERCS would receive only a fraction
of a share worth a total of $57.20. Figure 1(a) gives the payoﬀ at maturity (excluding dividends) of the
K-Mart PERCS, as a function of its underlying stock price.
The second example illustrates an issue of PEPS (Premium Equity Participating Securities). In June
2000, Valero Energy Corporation issued $150 million worth of PEPS at $25 per unit (which was the price
of 0.85837 shares of its common stock, which was then selling at $29.125 per share). The PEPS paid a
quarterly dividend 7.75%, while the dividend on the underlying common stock was only $2.75%. The PEPS
were mandatorily convertible to shares of common stock on August 18th, 2003, with the number of shares
per PEPS unit given to investors upon conversion depending on the price of the companies’ common stock:
if the price of the common was $29.125 or below (so that 0.85837 shares would be worth $25 or below),
then each PEPS unit would receive only 0.85837 shares of common stock, giving them a payoﬀ of $25. If
the common was between $29.125 and $34.95, then PEPS holders would receive a variable number of shares
such that their total value would remain at $25 (in other words, $25 was the “cap” value of the PEPS).
If, however, the common stock price exceeded a “threshold appreciation price” of $34.95 on the mandatory
conversion date, each PEPS holder would receive 0.71531 shares of common stock. Figure 1(b) gives the
payoﬀ at maturity (excluding dividends) of the Valero PEPS, as a function of its underlying stock price.
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Figure 1: Payoﬀ at Maturity (Excluding Dividends) of Two Mandatory Convertibles
holders received a fraction (83.3%) of the appreciation of the underlying stock beyond the cap value of $25.
On the other hand, while holders of PERCS received 100% of the appreciation of the common stock between
the stock price on the date of issue ($44.00) and the cap price of $57.20, the Valero PEPS holders did not
receive any appreciation on their investment until the stock price exceeded the threshold appreciation price
of $34.95 (since the cap on PEPS is usually set at the issue price, i.e, $25 in the case of Valero PEPS). In
other words, the PEPS holder did not share in the ﬁrst 20% of the appreciation in the underlying common
stock (between the $25 cap and the threshold appreciation price of $34.95). However, notice that both
the PERCS and the PEPS issues share the three features, common to all mandatory convertibles, that we
discussed above, namely, mandatory conversion, capped (either completely, as in the case of PERCS, or
partially, as in the case of PEPS) appreciation potential, and dividend yield signiﬁcantly in excess of the
underlying common stock.1
1 Both PERCS and PEPS oﬀerings were underwritten by Morgan Stanley. Most other mandatory convertibles, including
those underwritten investment banks other than Morgan Stanley, have a payoﬀ structure similar to PERCS and PEPS (though
these mandatory convertibles often diﬀer from PERCS and PEPS in terms of many institutional arrangements). Thus, ACES
(Automatically Convertible Equity securities), PRIDES (Preferred Redemption Increased Dividend Equity Securities), FE-
LINE PRIDES (Flexible Equity-Linked Exchangeable PRIDES), DECS, SAILS (Stock Appreciation Income Linked Securities),
MARCS (Mandatory Adjustable Redeemable Convertible Securities), and TAPS (Threshold Appreciation price Securities) are
examples of mandatory convertibles with a payoﬀ structure similar to PEPS. CHIPS (Common-linked Higher Income Partici-
pating debt Securities), EYES (Enhanced Yield Equity Securities), TARGETS (Targeted Growth Enhanced Term Securities),
and YES (Yield Enhanced Stock) are examples of securities which perform like PERCS. See Morgan Stanley (1998), and Nelken
(2000), for a more detailed listing.
3The increasing popularity of mandatory convertibles over the last decade as an instrument for raising
capital by ﬁrms prompt us to raise several questions. When should a ﬁrm issue mandatory convertibles to
raise capital, rather than issuing ordinary convertibles, or even more conventional securities such as equity
or straight debt? What explains the prevalence of the three fundamental features discussed above in almost
all mandatory convertibles? How should a mandatory convertible be designed in terms of the mix of various
features (e.g., the optimal cap, the number of shares of equity into which the mandatory convertible should be
exchanged for in the event of conversion, the dividend yield on the mandatory convertible)? Unfortunately,
there has been no theoretical analysis so far in the literature which enables us to answer such questions.
Neither has there been a comprehensive empirical study of these securities. The objective of this paper is
to develop a theoretical analysis of mandatory convertibles which allows us to answer the above and related
questions, and to present empirical evidence regarding the implications of this theory.
Our analysis rests on two assumptions based on certain stylized facts about the mandatory convertibles
market (and the securities market in general). First, ﬁrms are concerned about the misvaluation of their
securities in the capital market, and would like to issue securities which would yield them the required amount
of capital with the minimum dilution in the equity holdings of current shareholders. Second, ﬁrms are also
concerned about the probability of being in ﬁnancial distress (bankruptcy), and incurring ﬁnancial distress
costs. Thus, we consider a setting of asymmetric information, where ﬁrm insiders have more information
about the intrinsic value of their ﬁrm compared to potential outside investors in the ﬁr m .I ns u c has e t t i n g ,
higher valued ﬁrms have an incentive to distinguish themselves from lower intrinsic valued ﬁrms in order to
obtain their true value in the securities market. One way to accomplish this is to issue securities such as
straight debt and ordinary (callable) convertibles, which have the possibility of forcing the ﬁrm into ﬁnancial
distress: since, for the same amount of debt issued, lower intrinsic valued ﬁrms have a higher chance of going
into ﬁnancial distress compared to higher intrinsic valued ﬁrms, the former would not wish to mimic such
a strategy, enabling higher intrinsic valued ﬁrms to separate themselves from lower-intrinsic valued ﬁrms,
thereby obtaining their true valuation in the securities market.
Such signaling strategies, however, have their own pitfalls. In a world with uncertainty, higher valued
4ﬁrms themselves have a positive probability of being in ﬁnancial distress, and when costs of ﬁnancial distress
are signiﬁcant, the costs of issuing straight debt or ordinary convertibles to distinguish themselves may
exceed the valuation beneﬁts from doing so (recall that there is a signiﬁcant risk of ﬁnancial distress in
the case of ordinary convertibles, since conversion is at the option of the convertible holder alone).2 In
such a situation, ﬁrms have an incentive to turn to mandatory convertibles. Since conversion to equity
is mandatory in the case of these securities, ﬁrms do not have to be concerned about incurring ﬁnancial
distress costs if such securities are issued instead of straight debt or ordinary callable convertibles.3 At
the same time, mandatory convertibles enable the ﬁrm to minimize the extent of undervaluation of the
ﬁr m ’ ss e c u r i t i e s :w es h o wt h a t ,w h i l es o m ee x t e n to fu ndervaluation of intrinsically higher-valued ﬁrms is
unavoidable if mandatory convertibles are issued, such undervaluation is lower than would be the case if
the ﬁrm issued other securities (such as equity) which also do not increase the chance of the ﬁrm going into
ﬁnancial distress. Thus, whether a ﬁrm chooses, in equilibrium, to issue mandatory convertibles, or more
conventional securities like straight debt, ordinary callable convertibles, or equity, depends on the magnitude
of the costs and beneﬁts of issuing these diﬀerent securities.
In the above setting, we develop a variety of results relevant to a ﬁrm’s choice of mandatory convertibles as
a means of raising capital. First, we develop predictions regarding the kind of ﬁrms which issue mandatory
convertibles rather than more conventional securities, and the situations in which such ﬁrms will issue
mandatory convertibles. In particular, our model predicts that, when faced with a choice between ordinary
and mandatory convertibles, ﬁrms facing a larger extent of asymmetric information, but a relative smaller
probability of ﬁnancial distress will choose to issue ordinary convertibles, while those facing a smaller extent
of asymmetric information, but a larger ﬁnancial distress probability will issue mandatory convertibles.
2 The callability feature of convertibles does not mitigate this danger of the convertibles remaining as a ﬁxed income security
and the ﬁrm incurring bankruptcy costs. Calling these convertibles in order to force conversion will be optimal for the ﬁrm only
if the share price is high enough, in which there is no danger of bankruptcy in the ﬁrst place. In other words, the callability
feature of convertibles only serves to expedite conversion by convertible holders in the range of share prices where it is optimal
for them to convert to equity in the ﬁr s tp l a c e ;i tc a n n o tf o r c ec o n v e r s i o ni ft h es t o c kp r i c ei sl o w .
3 This advantage of mandatory convertibles in avoiding the costs associated with ﬁnancial distress has been noted by
practioners. For example, see a recent magazine story entitled “Tech Companies Have a New Currency, and Its Mandatory”
(Red Herring, January 2002). We quote: “Because they are guaranteed to convert to equity, potential yield and redemption
hassles for their issuers that other bonds carry. ’If the stock drops, you don’t get stuck with a bond that you have to continue to
service’ says F. Barry Nelson, portfolio manager of Advent Capital Management, which has $900 million invested in convertibles.”
5Thus, a larger ﬁrm, which is already highly leveraged (or facing a ﬁnancial downturn) will choose mandatory
convertibles over ordinary convertibles, while a smaller ﬁrm, which is relatively debt free will make the
reverse choice.
Second, we develop a rationale for the prevalence of the three common features of mandatory convertibles
discussed above, namely, mandatory conversion, capped (or limited) capital appreciation, and higher dividend
yield relative to equity. Third, we characterize the optimal conﬁguration of the above three features as well
as the optimal exchange ratio (fraction of a ﬁrm’s equity the mandatory convertible issue should convert
into) for an issue of mandatory convertibles. Fourth, we develop implications for the abnormal returns to
the ﬁrm’s equity upon the announcement of an issue of mandatory convertibles: our analysis predicts that
the announcement eﬀect of mandatory convertibles will be either zero or negative, depending upon whether
mandatory convertibles are issued in a fully pooling or a partially pooling equilibrium. This prediction
implies that, if we split up a sample of mandatory convertible issues by the probability of ﬁnancial distress
of the issuing ﬁrm at the time of issue, mandatory convertible issues of ﬁrms having a lower ﬁnancial distress
probability can be expected to have a less negative announcement eﬀect. Our analysis also has predictions
about the operating performance of a sample of issuers of mandatory convertibles relative to those of a
matched sample of non-issuers.
Finally, we test the implications of our theory on a sample of ﬁrms which have chosen to issue either
ordinary or mandatory convertibles, making use of commonly used proxies for asymmetric information (e.g.,
number of analysts following a ﬁrm, standard deviation of analyst forecasts, forecast error) and probability of
ﬁnancial distress (Altman’s Z-score, existing ﬁrm leverage). The evidence generally supports the implications
of our theory. In particular, we ﬁnd that it is indeed ﬁrms facing a smaller extent of information asymmetry
but a larger ﬁnancial distress probability that issue mandatory convertibles, while those facing a larger extent
of information asymmetry and a smaller ﬁnancial distress probability that issue ordinary convertibles. Our
evidence also supports the implications of our theory regarding the announcement eﬀects of mandatory
convertible issues and the post-issue operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers relative to
that of a matched sample of non-issuers. We also document that mandatory convertible issuers do not
6exhibit long-term negative abnormal stock performance (in contrast to the negative abnormal long-term
stock performance of ordinary convertible issuers that has been documented in the literature).
It is not our view here that asymmetric information and ﬁnancial distress costs are the only two factors
driving the issuance of mandatory convertibles. As Miller has noted, a number of ﬁnancial innovations over
the last twenty years have been driving by considerations of minimizing taxes: mandatory convertibles are no
exception. Many mandatory convertible securities (e.g., PEPS and FELINE PRIDES) oﬀer tax advantages:
e.g., deductibility of the dividend paid, similar to the coupon paid on corporate debt. However, it is worth
noting that many of the original mandatory convertible issues were not tax advantaged (i.e., the dividend
paid was not tax deductible), so that it is unlikely that the ﬁnancial innovation of mandatory convertibles
issues was prompted purely as a means of minimizing taxes. Rather, it seems to be the case that, while
originally driven by other considerations, tax advantaged structures were added to make these securities
more attractive to issuers. Another motivation driving the issuance of mandatory convertibles are legal
restrictions on liquidating securities faced by large shareholders in some ﬁrms. These large shareholders
issue mandatory convertibles which are convertible into the equity of their portfolio ﬁrms, thus immediately
monetizing their holdings in their portfolio ﬁrms without having to sell these holdings immediately. Finally,
another motivation driving the issuance of some mandatory convertibles may be ”clientele” eﬀects, i.e.,
driven by the desire of issuing ﬁrm’s to take advantage of institutional investors’ desire for higher dividend
paying securities. In summary, similar to other securities like debt and equity, the issuance of mandatory
convertibles is also probably driven by many diﬀerent market imperfections: we have chosen to focus here
only on asymmetric information and ﬁnancial distress costs as two of the most important of these, abstracting
away from other considerations for the sake of analytical tractability.4
The existing literature on mandatory convertibles is quite small. Arzac (1997) provides an good descrip-
tion of some mandatory convertibles such as PERCS and DECS, with some discussion of the valuation of
4 Note that, even if we explicitly include any tax advantages of issuing mandatory convertibles in our theoretical analysis,
the equilibria studied here will continue to exist, though the parameter regions in which various equilibria arise will be modiﬁed.
In other words, our qualitative results will hold even in this case.
7these based on the option pricing methodology.5 As mentioned before, there have been no theoretical
models of the choice of ﬁrms between mandatory convertibles and other securities in the literature so far,
and almost no empirical literature. Thus, the theoretical literature closest to this paper is the literature
on the issue of ordinary convertibles in an environment of asymmetric information: see, e.g., Brennan and
Kraus (1987), Constantinides and Grundy (1989), and Stein (1992).6 In particular, the rationale for issuing
ordinary convertibles in our setting is similar to that in Stein (1992), though ordinary convertibles are not
the focus of this paper. It is important to note that, the rationale for the issuance of mandatory convertibles
that we present here is completely new, and not derived from explanations for the issuance of any other
security (including ordinary convertibles) that has been presented so far in the literature.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes the
equilibrium of the model and develops results. Section 4 characterizes the equilibrium design of mandatory
convertibles. Section 5 describes the implications of the model, and develops testable hypotheses. Section 6
desribes our empirical methodolgy and presents the results of our empirical tests. Section 7 concludes. The
proofs of all propositions are conﬁned to the appendix.
2 The Model
The model has three dates (t =0 ,1,2). Consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur owning an all-equity ﬁrm.
To begin with, we assume that the entrepreneur owns all the equity in the ﬁrm: for simplicity, we normalize
the number of shares of equity at t=0 to be one. The ﬁrm needs to raise an amount of I externally to ﬁnance
a new positive net present value project. We assume that the ﬁrm has no other ongoing projects, so that
the cash ﬂows received by the ﬁrm are the same as those generated by the new project. We normalize the
risk-free rate of return to be zero, and that the investors are risk-neutral.
5 There are also a few other practitioner oriented discussions and pedagogical cases on mandatory convertibles. Excellent
examples include the HBS cases on Avon Products PERCS (Tiemann, 1989), Telmex PRIDES (Seasholes and Froot, 1996),
Times Mirror PEPS (Tufano and Poetzscher, 1996), and Cox Communications FELINE PRIDES (Chacko and Tufano, 2000).
6 Several other papers provide rationales for issuing ordinary convertibles which are not based on asymmetric information.
See e.g. Green (1984), Mayers (1998), Brennan and Kraus (1987), and Brennan and Schwartz (1988).
82.1 Cash Flow and Information Structure
There are three types of ﬁrms: good (type G hereafter), medium (type M hereafter), or bad (type B
hereafter). The cash ﬂows from the new investment are realized at time 2. Each ﬁrm receives a gross cash
ﬂow of xH (the high cash ﬂow) or xL (the low cash ﬂow) at this date, xH >I>x L.T h ed i ﬀerences between
the three types of ﬁrms are characterized by their probabilities of receiving the high and low cash ﬂows at
time 2. Further, at time 1, these ﬁrms “deteriorate” with a certain probability. In the event of deterioration,
the ﬁrm realizes the low cash ﬂow xL with probability 1. Thus, the type G and type M ﬁrms deteriorate
with a probability φ1, while the type B deteriorates with a probability φ2 >φ 1. In the event there is no
deterioration at time 1, the type G receives the high cash ﬂow with probability 1, while both the type M
and type B ﬁrms have a probability 1−δ of receiving the high cash ﬂow xH and δ of receiving the low cash
ﬂow xL. In summary, the ex ante (time 0) probability of receiving the low cash ﬂo wo ft h et y p eBﬁrm,
φ2 +( 1− φ2)δ, will be greater than that of the type M ﬁrm, φ1 +( 1− φ1)δ, which in turn will be greater
than that from the type G ﬁrm, φ1. Thus, the expected cash ﬂow from the type G ﬁrm is greater than that
from the type M, which in turn is greater than that from the type B. Since any type of ﬁrm’s project has
positive NPV, [φ2+δ(1−φ2)]xL+(1−δ)(1−φ2)xH ≥ I.T h ec a s hﬂow structure of the three types of ﬁrms
is depicted in ﬁgure 2.
Firm types are private information to the entrepreneur at time 0, with outsiders having only a prior
probability distribution over ﬁrm types. The outsiders’ prior of any given ﬁrm being of type G, M or B are
γ1, γ2,a n dγ3 respectively, γ1 + γ2 + γ3 =1 . At time 1, however, outsiders observe whether a ﬁrm has
deteriorated or not. Based on this additional information, they engage in Bayesian updating about the type
of the ﬁrm. At time 2, all asymmetric information is resolved. The sequence of events is given in ﬁgure 3.
2.2 Menu of Securities
The entrepreneur can issue one of four diﬀerent securities to raise the required external ﬁnancing I:
straight risky debt (“straight debt” hereafter), ordinary callable convertible debt (“ordinary convertible”
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• Entrepreneur, with private information about the firm type (G, 
M, or B), chooses among debt, ordinary convertibles, 
mandatory convertibles, or equity to finance the new project.
• Firm invests in the new project.
• The firm may deteriorate with a certain probability.
• Investors observe the deterioration of the firm and update their
prior beliefs about the firm type.
• The firm has the right to call ordinary convertibles at this date; 
ordinary convertible-holders may choose to convert to equity.
• All cash flows are realized and distributed 
according to the sharing rules specified by 
the securities issued. 
• All asymmetric information is resolved.
t = 0
• Mandatory convertibles automatically 
convert to equity.
Figure 3: Sequence of Events
10If the entrepreneur chooses to issue debt, he receives an amount I upfront at t=0, and promises to pay an
amount Pd to the debt holder at t=2. If he chooses to issue ordinary callable convertible debt, he determines
t h ef a c ev a l u ePc (payable to the convertible holders at t=2), the conversion ratio nc,a n dt h ec a l lp r i c eK
at t=0. At t=1, he has the right to redeem (“call”) the convertibles at the call price K.I f t h e i n v e s t o r s
convert, they receive a ratio nc of the total equity. If the convertible is not called, it is equivalent to a debt
contract, with the ﬁrm obligated to pay Pc to the investors at t=2. In other words, Pc is the sum of the
principal and coupon if the convertible remains as straight debt. Alternatively, if the entrepreneur chooses
to issue equity, he exchanges a fraction ne of the total equity to the investors for an amount I.
Finally, if the entrepreneur chooses to ﬁnance the amount I by issuing the mandatory convertible, these
convertibles mandatorily convert to the ﬁrm’s equity in two periods (prior to the resolution of information
asymmetry at t=2). In this case, investors are promised a fraction nm (“the exchange ratio”) of the ﬁrm’s
equity provided the market value of this equity exchanged is less than a “cap” amount Um. Here, we assume
nm ≤ n,w h e r en i st h em a x i m a lp o s s i b l ee x c h a n g er a t i o ,n ≤ 1. n =1implies that the entrepreneur
is willing to allow his entire equity holding in the ﬁrm to be exchanged for mandatory convertibles upon
conversion; n<1 implies that the entrepreneur may need to maintain a certain fraction of equity to be
motivated to operate the ﬁrm or due to considerations of maintaining control in the ﬁrm. If the market
value of the promised fraction of equity at t=1 is greater than Um, then investors receive only shares worth
the amount Um. In addition, mandatory convertible holders receive an aggregate amount D of dividends
over the life of the convertible.7 For analytical simplicity, we will assume that the actual payment of this
amount D takes place at t=2.8 We also assume that D ≤ dxL,w h e r ed is the maximum possible fraction
of the ﬁrm’s sure cash ﬂow that can be paid out as dividends.9 Clearly, d ≤ 1; d =1implies that the ﬁrm
7 In practice, the dividend paid on mandatory convertibles is greater than that on common equity. For simplicity, we assume
h e r et h a tt h ed i v i d e n dp a i do nc o m m o ne q u i t yi sz e r o .T h u s ,o n ec a nt h i n ko ft h i sd i v i d e n dD paid to mandatory convertible
holders in our model as the dividend amount paid in excess of that paid to common equity.
8 This assumption is made only to minimize the complexity of our analysis. Since the discount rate is zero, assuming that
t h ed i v i d e n d sa r ep a i di nq u a r t e r l ya m o u n t so v e rt h el i f eo ft h em a n d a t o r yc o n v e r t i b l e( a si st h ec a s ei np r a c t i c e )i se q u i v a l e n t
to a single payout at t =2 , and will not change the nature of our results.
9 We use the term dividends here only to refer to sure (certain) cash ﬂows proposed to investors, which is why we assume
that dividends can at most equal xL (which happens only when d =1 ). We will see later that it is the sure cash ﬂow promised
to investors that is important in the design of mandatory convertibles. Of course, in practice, ﬁrms can promise additional
(uncertain) cash ﬂows to investors over and above this amount. But investors see this as no diﬀerent from other cash ﬂows
11is free to pay out its entire cash ﬂow to the investors when the cash ﬂow realized is low, and d<1 implies
that the ﬁrm needs part of its realized cash ﬂows to cover other operational expenses or implement other
projects. We will show later that both the cap Um and the dividends paid D of the mandatory convertible
are determined endogenously in equilibrium.
If straight debt is issued by the entrepreneur or if ordinary convertibles are issued and the ﬁrm does not
convert at t=1 (in which case, the convertible is equivalent to a debt contract), costly ﬁnancial distress may
occur at t=2. If the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow at this date is not suﬃcient to pay the promised payment to the debt
holders in full, the ﬁrm will be forced to declare bankruptcy. In this case, an exogenous deadweight cost
C>0 is imposed on the entrepreneur. Remember that since xL <I<x H, bankruptcy occurs if and only
if the cash ﬂow at t=2 turns to be low. Thus, the ex-ante (time 0) probability of bankruptcy is the same as
the ex-ante probability of earning a low cash ﬂow, which is φ1 for a type G ﬁrm, φ1 + δ(1 − φ1) for a type
M ﬁrm, and φ2 + δ(1 − φ2) for a type B ﬁrm.
Of the above menu of contracts, the security actually issued by the ﬁrm will be determined in equilibrium:
i.e., not all securities will be oﬀered in all situations. We assume that the ﬁrm ﬁrst chooses the security to be
issued from the above menu (at t=0). Further, in the case where an ordinary convertible is issued, the ﬁrm
chooses at t=1 whether or not to force conversion by calling the convertible; also, investors choose whether
or not to convert these convertibles to equity at this date.
2.3 The Objective of the Firm and Outside Investors
The ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize the expected long-term (t =2 ) value of the equity held by the
entrepreneur (or equivalently, the expected total cash ﬂows of the project), net of the any costs associated
with the external ﬁnancing of the amount I.T h eﬁrm has four options to ﬁnance the new project: straight
debt, conventional convertibles, mandatory convertibles, or equity. Thus, at t=0, the ﬁrm strategically
chooses the type of security and then price the security optimally to maximize his objective. And at t=1, in
the case of ordinary convertibles, the ﬁrm chooses to execute the conversion only when the equity foregone
available at t=2. We therefore choose to refer only to the sure cash ﬂow promised to investors as dividends, clubbing all
uncertain cash ﬂows available to investors together as the “distribution of residual project cash ﬂows” at t=2.
12to exchange the convertibles is less than the sum of the ﬁxed payment promised by the convertibles and the
potential bankruptcy cost.
The investors’ objective is to maximize the sum of the expected long-term value (at t=2) of equity held
by them and the cash payment paid by the ﬁrm at t=2. Thus, holders of ordinary convertibles choose to
convert to the equity only when the value of equity obtained through the exchange exceeds the ﬁxed payment
promised by the convertibles.
3 The Equilibrium
Deﬁnition of equilibrium. An equilibrium in this model consists of (i) the ﬁrm’s choice at t=0 about the
security to be issued to the investors (including the terms of the security such as ﬁxed-payment promised to
be paid at t=2, ratio of the equity to be exchanged in the case of convertibles and equity, the cap in the case
of mandatory convertibles, etc.); (ii) a choice by the investors on whether to convert or not in the case of the
ordinary convertibles. Each of the above choices by the ﬁrm and by the investors should satisfy the following
requirements: (a) the choice of each type of ﬁrm maximizes his objective, given his equilibrium belief about
the choice of the other party; (b) the beliefs of all three types of ﬁrm are rational, given the equilibrium
choice of the others; along the equilibrium path, these beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule; (c) we restrict
the equilibrium beliefs as well as the beliefs of investors in response to oﬀ-equilibrium moves by any type of
ﬁrm to be such that they satisfy the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion (see Cho and Kreps (1987)); (d) whenever
there are multiple equilibria satisfying the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion, the prevailing equilibrium is that
one where the higher type ﬁrm issues the security giving a higher value of its objective, with priority given
to the payoﬀ o ft h et y p eGo v e rt h et y p eMa n dt h a to ft h et y p eMo v e rt h et y p eB . 10 Thus, the equilibrium
concept we use is that of the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) (requirement (a) and (b)), satisfying the
10 There are two possible situations with multiple Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBEs). If the type G ﬁrm obtains a higher
value of its objective in a separating PBE compared to a fully pooling PBE, then only the separating equilibrium survives the
Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion (since otherwise, the type G ﬁrm has an inventive to deviate while the type M and type B do not).
Similarly, if the type G ﬁrm obtains a higher payoﬀ in a partially pooling PBE compared to a fully pooling PBE, then the fully
pooling PBE is again eliminated by Cho-Kreps. Then, the only situations when there are multiple PBEs satisfying Cho-Kreps
i sw h e nt h et y p eGﬁrm obtains a higher payoﬀ in a fully pooling PBE compared to a partially pooling (where only the type
M and type B pool) or separating PBE; or the type M ﬁrm obtains a higher payoﬀ in a partially pooling PBE compared to
a separating PBE. Our condition (d) applies only in the last two situations. Note that condition (d) is similar in spirit to the
notion of “eﬃcient” PBE applied by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) to choose among multiple equilibria.
13additional requirements imposed by condition (c) and (d).
In the following analysis, we deﬁne a ≡ xH
xL .T h u s ,a can be viewed as a factor measuring the degree of
asymmetric information in the market: the larger the a, the greater the degree of asymmetric information.
Also, we assume throughout that the deadweight cost of bankruptcy, C, is a constant and greater than a
certain minimum level C. Further, we assume that the outsiders prior that a ﬁrm is of type B, γ3 ≥ γ. C
and γ are explicitly deﬁned in the appendix.11 Finally, we assume n =1and d =1in this section only; we
relax this assumption in the next section.12
We ﬁrst consider the case where the extent of asymmetric information in the capital market is high, while
the ex-ante probability of bankruptcy of the ﬁrm is not too large. Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium
in this situation.13
Proposition 1 (Ordinary Convertibles in a Separating Equilibrium) If the probability of deterio-
ration of the type G and the type M ﬁrms φ1 is smaller than a certain threshold value φ, or the extent of
asymmetric information is large so that a ≥ a, then the equilibrium is separating and involves the following:
T h et y p eGﬁrm: It issues straight debt at t=0, which has a face value Pd =
I−φ1xL
1−φ1 and matures at
t=2.
The type M ﬁrm: It issues a ordinary convertible at t=0, with a call price K, xL <K<I ,af a c e
value Pc >x L, which is convertible to a fraction nc =
I−φ1xL
(1−φ1)[δxH+δxL] of the ﬁrm’s equity. It calls back the
convertible at time 1, if its conversion value at that time is below the call price K.14
T h et y p eBﬁrm: At time 0, it raises the amount I by issuing new equity which will equal a fraction
ne = I
[(1−δ)(1−φ2)xH+(1−(1−δ)(1−φ2))xL] of the ﬁrm’s total equity outstanding.
Recall that the ex ante probability of the low cash ﬂow (i.e., bankruptcy if debt is issued) for the type G
and type M ﬁrms is a function of both the probability of deterioration φ1 and the probability of the low cash
ﬂow in the event of no deterioration (0 for the type G ﬁrm and δ for the type M). The above proposition thus
states that, if the ex ante probability of bankruptcy of the two types of ﬁrms is low enough, or the extent
of asymmetric information they face is high enough, these two types of ﬁrms ﬁnd it optimal to distinguish
11 This parameter assumption merely means to rule out other equilibria, e.g., a partially pooling equilibrium in which the
t y p eGa n dt h et y p eMﬁrms issue straight debt and the type B ﬁrm issues equity. Since our focus in this paper is on mandatory
and ordinary convertibles, we choose not to describe these equilibria here. Details of such equilibria are available to interested
readers upon request.
12 Note that this assumption in this section aﬀects the range of the parameters in which various equilibria occur but will not
change the qualitative nature of these equilibria.
13 This equilibrium is similar to Stein (1992). While the ordinary convertible is not the focus of our paper, we choose to
present this proposition since it serves as a basis for our analysis on the choice between ordinary convertibles and mandatory
convertibles,
14 The conversion value of a convertible is deﬁned as the market value of the equity obtained upon conversion.
14themselves from the type B ﬁrm (and from each other) by issuing straight debt and ordinary convertible debt
respectively. The type B ﬁrm, on the other hand, does not ﬁnd it optimal to mimic the type M and type G
ﬁrm by issuing similar securities since its probability of bankruptcy is greater than the above two types. It
therefore funds its project by issuing equity, thereby fully revealing its type as well. We now discuss in detail
the optimization problem faced by each type of ﬁrm in choosing the security to issue in equilibrium.15
The Type G Firm’s Problem
T h et y p eGﬁrm issues debt instead of the other securities since it wants to distinguish itself from the
type M and the type B ﬁr m s .T h et y p eMa n dt y p eBﬁr m sh a v ea ni n c e n t i v et om i m i ct h et y p eGb yi s s u i n g
debt because, if they could be perceived as the type G, their securities would be overvalued. However, in
equilibrium, they choose not to do so since they know that, if they pool, they are more likely to incur a
bankruptcy cost compared to the case where they don’t pool. Such a greater expected bankruptcy cost
exceeds the beneﬁt of mimicking (arising from the overpricing of the securities) to the type M and type B.
Similar to the type M and type B, the type G also may incur a bankruptcy cost with some probability if it
issues debt. However, issuing debt allows the type G to separate itself from the type M and type B, thus
avoiding the under-valuation of its security which would arise if it pooled with the other two types. Further,
the extent of such under-valuation faced by the type G is large as the extent of asymmetric information
faced by the ﬁrm in the security market is large. Thus, when the probability of bankruptcy of the type G is
small enough, or when the extent of asymmetric information it faces in the security market is large enough
(so that the beneﬁt of separation from the other types is large enough), then the type G ﬁrm prefers to issue
debt in equilibrium.
In summary, the type G ﬁrm’s decision to issue debt in equilibrium arises from the following optimization
problem:
Max ΠG =( 1− φ1)(xH − Pd) − φ1C,( 1 )
15 Outside investors: If the ﬁrm issues straight debt, they infer that the ﬁrm is of type G with probability 1. If the ﬁrm issues
a ordinary convertible, they infer that the ﬁrm is of type M with probability 1. They convert the convertibles to equity at t=1.
If the ﬁrm issues equity, they infer that the ﬁrm is of type B with probability 1.
15subject to the following incentive compatibility (IC) constraints and the break-even constraint:
ΠB =[ ( 1 − δ)(1 − φ2)xH +( 1− (1 − δ)(1 − φ2))xL](1 − ne) (2)
≥ ΠB|G =( 1− δ)(1 − φ2)(xH − Pd) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ2)]C,
ΠM =( 1 − φ1)[(1 − δ)xH + δxL](1 − nc) − φ1C (3)
≥ ΠM|G =( 1− δ)(1 − φ1)(xH − Pd) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)]C;
I ≤ φ1xL +( 1− φ1)Pd.( 4 )
Here, the IC constraint (2) guarantees that the type B ﬁrm will issue the equity in equilibrium instead
of issuing debt. ΠB is the value of equity owned by the entrepreneur in the type B ﬁrm if the type B does
not mimic. ΠB|G is the expected cash ﬂow to the entrepreneur if the type B mimics the type G by issuing
debt. It equals the residual cash ﬂow after paying Pd to the investors at t=2, net of the potential bankruptcy
cost, [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ2)]C. Similarly, the IC constraint (3) guarantees that the type M ﬁrm will issue the
conventional convertibles in equilibrium instead of issuing debt. Here, nc is the ratio of the total equity to
exchange for the convertibles when the convertibles are redeemed at t=1; ΠM is the expected cash ﬂows to
the entrepreneur if the type M issues the ordinary convertibles, which equals the value of equity after the
redemption of the convertibles net of the expected bankruptcy cost, φ1C. ΠM|G is the expected cash ﬂow to
the entrepreneur if the type M mimics the type G by issuing the debt. It equals the residual cash ﬂow after
paying the investors at t=2 net of the potential bankruptcy cost, [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)]C. Finally, constraint
(4) ensures that the promised payment to the investors at t=2, Pd, should be such that investors at least
break-even from their investment in the type G ﬁrm.
The Type M Firm’s Problem
As discussed before, the type M ﬁrm chooses to separate itself from the type B by issuing convertible debt,
rather than issuing equity and pooling with the type B. Such pooling would result in the type M’s securities
being undervalued, with the extent of under-valuation increasing in the extent of asymmetric information
faced by the ﬁrm in the securities market.
The type M prefers to separate itself by issuing ordinary convertible debt rather than straight debt. By
16doing so, it separates itself not only from the type B, but the type G ﬁrm as well, even though mimicking the
type G would have enabled it to obtain a higher price for its securities than if it separates (since pooling with
the type G would allow its securities to be overvalued, while separating from both type G and type B would
only allow the ﬁrm’s security to correctly priced). The type M chooses to issue ordinary convertibles rather
than straight debt due to the fact that issuing convertibles allows it to reduce the probability of bankruptcy,
since, in the event the ﬁrm does not deteriorate at time 1, the ﬁrm’s share price goes up at that time, so
that the ﬁrm is able to force conversion to equity by calling back the convertible, thereby avoiding incurring
bankruptcy costs in this scenario. Note, however, that issuing ordinary convertibles does not completely
eliminate the probability of bankruptcy for the type M ﬁrm: if the ﬁrm deteriorate at time 1, the convertible
remains as long-term debt, since the conversion value of the convertible will be below the call price K in this
case and the ﬁrm is unable to call back the convertible.16 However, as long as the deadweight bankruptcy
cost C ≥ C so that the reduction in expected bankruptcy costs achieved by issuing ordinary convertible debt
is greater than the beneﬁt of mimicking the type G by issuing straight debt, the ﬁrm prefers to issue the
former, thus separating itself from the type G as well as the type B ﬁrm in equilibrium.
In summary, the type M chooses to issue ordinary convertible debt as the solution to the following
optimization problem:
Max ΠM =( 1− φ1)[(1 − δ)xH + δxL](1 − nc) − φ1C,
subject to the IC constraints of the type G and type B respectively:
ΠG ≥ ΠG|M =( 1− φ1)(1 − nc)xH − φ1C,( 5 )
ΠB ≥ ΠB|M =( 1− φ2)[(1 − δ)xH + δxL](1 − nc) − φ2C;( 6 )
and the break-even constraint of investors:
nc(1 − φ1)[(1 − δ)xH + δxL]+φ1xL ≥ I.( 7 )
16 Ad e t e r i o r a t e dﬁr m ,w h e t h e ri ti st y p eMo rt y p eB ,w i l ln o to n l yb eu n a b l et ou s et h ec a l lp r o v i s i o nt of o r c ec o n v e r s i o n ,
but will also be unable to use this provision to exchange the convertible for cash. Since xL <K , the call price exceeds the
market value of the ﬁrm upon deterioration, so that the ﬁr mw i l ln o tb ea b l et or a i s et h ec a s ha tt i m e1t op a yt h ec a l lp r i c eK.
17Here, ΠG|M and ΠB|M are the expected cash ﬂows that would accrue to the type G and the type B ﬁrms
respectively if they issue ordinary convertibles, and equal to the value of equity after the redemption of the
convertibles net of their expected bankruptcy costs.17
The Type B Firm’s Problem
The type B’s probability of attaining the low cash ﬂow xL is signiﬁcantly greater than that of the type
G and the type M. This means that , if it mimics the type G or the type M by issuing straight debt or
ordinary convertibles, the type B ﬁrm will incur a signiﬁcantly higher probability of bankruptcy compared
to the above two types. Thus, as long as the deadweight cost of bankruptcy is signiﬁcant (so that C ≥ C),
t h ec o s to fm i m i c k i n gt h et y p eGa n dt y p eMi sl a r g e rt h a nt h eb e n e ﬁt of doing so (arising from the ability
to overprice its securities). The type B ﬁrm therefore issues equity, revealing its type in equilibrium. In
summary, the type B maximizes its objective ΠB given by (2), subject to the type G and type M’s incentive
compatibility constraints and the investors’ break-even constraint.
We now study the situation where the extent of asymmetric information in the securities market is small
compared to the situation characterized in proposition 1, but the ex ante probability of bankruptcy facing
the ﬁrm is larger. Mandatory convertibles emerge as the security issued in equilibrium in this situation.
There are two scenarios under which mandatory convertibles are issued. In the ﬁrst scenario (characterized
in proposition 2), the bankruptcy probability, while greater than in the situation characterized in proposition
1, is not too large. In the second scenario (proposition 3), the bankruptcy probability facing the issuing ﬁrm
is larger than that in the situation characterized in proposition 2.
In the following proposition, we denote by V 0
MB the expected value of a ﬁrm which issue mandatory
convertibles at time 0, in a partially pooling equilibrium where both the type M and type B ﬁrms issue
mandatory convertibles (as in proposition 2); and by V 1
MB the expected time 1 value of a ﬁrm which issues
mandatory convertibles at time 0, in the same partially pooling equilibrium, provided the ﬁrm does not
deteriorate at time 1.
17 Note that the IC constraint of the type G ﬁrm is satisﬁed trivially here, since the type G ﬁrm does not beneﬁta ta l lf r o m
mimicking the type M.
18Proposition 2 (Mandatory Convertibles in a Partially Pooling Equilibrium) If any one of the
following two conditions hold:18
(a) The probability of deterioration of the type M and type G ﬁrms, φ1, is larger than a threshold value φ,
and δ ≥ δ s ot h a tt h et y p eMﬁrm’s low cash ﬂow probability is signiﬁcantly larger than that of the type
G; or
(b) The extent of asymmetric information facing the ﬁrm is moderate, so that a ∈ [a, a],
then the equilibrium is partially pooling and involves the following:
T h et y p eGﬁrm: It issues straight debt at t=0, and pays an amount of Pd =
I−φ1xL
1−φ1 at t=2.
T h et y p eMa n dt h et y p eBﬁrm: Both types of ﬁrm issue mandatory convertibles at t=0. Upon
maturity, the convertibles will be converted to a fraction n∗
m ≥ I−xL
V 0
MB−xL of the ﬁrm’s equity mandatorily, but




MB. The dividends D∗
on these mandatory convertibles will be set equal to xL.
In this equilibrium, the type G still prefers to issue debt and thereby distinguish itself from the type M and
type B, while the type M ﬁrm prefers to pool with the type B by issuing mandatory convertibles. Remember
that, if the type M were to choose to separate from the type B, it can eliminate the potential ﬁnancing
cost arising from asymmetric information (i.e., the under-valuation of securities relative to their intrinsic
value), but may incur a bankruptcy cost in the future. Thus, when the type M’s expected bankruptcy cost
is suﬃciently large (as in the case φ1 ≥ φ and δ ≥ δ), or when the extent of asymmetric information in the
market is small enough (as in the case a ≤ a), the cost of separating exceeds the beneﬁt of doing so. The
type M therefore chooses to pool with the type B.
The type M will not choose to issue straight debt or ordinary convertible to pool, since these securities
may cause the ﬁrm to go bankrupt at time 2 if the ﬁrm deteriorates at time 1 (recall that the type M’s low
cash ﬂow probability is signiﬁcantly greater than that of the type G). In contrast, in the case of mandatory
convertibles, there is no such danger of bankruptcy, since conversion to equity is mandatory. Further, the
type M prefers to issue mandatory convertibles to issuing equity as well. This is because, unlike equity,
mandatory convertibles provide a “cap” on the “upside” cash ﬂow paid to security holders, compensating
them for this cap with an incremental dividend payment, D<x L.T h e e ﬀect of this cap is to reduce the
diﬀerence in the cash ﬂow obtained by investors in the high and the low cash ﬂow scenarios. This, in turn,
18 Outside investors infer that a ﬁrm is of type G with probability 1, if the ﬁrm issues straight debt. If the ﬁrm issues a
ordinary convertible, they infer that the ﬁrm is of type M with probability
γ2
γ2+γ3or type B with probability
γ3
γ2+γ3.
19means that the diﬀerence between the intrinsic (true) values of mandatory convertibles issued by the type
Ma n dt y p eBﬁr m si sl e s st h a nt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gd i ﬀerence in the intrinsic values of the equity issued by
these two types of ﬁrms. Thus, the subsidization of the type B ﬁr mb yt h et y p eMi sl o w e ri ft h et y p eM
issues mandatory convertibles, so that the under-valuation of the type M ﬁrm’s securities due to asymmetric
information is less if it issues mandatory convertibles rather than equity (in other words, the market value
of mandatory convertibles is less sensitive to asymmetric information compared to that of equity).
Thus, in equilibrium, the type M ﬁrm maximizes:




)[(1 − δ)xH + δxL − D],( 8 )
subject to the IC constraint (9) ensuring that the type G has no incentive to mimic, and the break-even
constraint of investors (10):
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Here, ΠG is given in (1) and ΠG|MB is the cash ﬂow accruing to the type G if it mimics the type M and
type B;
γ3φ2+γ2φ1
γ2+γ3 is the probability of deterioration at t=1 for the ﬁrm issuing mandatory convertibles;




MB − D) is
the value of the equity received by the investors if the ﬁrm does not deteriorate.
In equilibrium, the type G ﬁr ms t i l lc h o o s e st oi s s u ed e b ta n ds e p a r a t ef r o mt h et y p eMa n dt y p eB ,
since, as long as δ ≥ δ,i t sb e n e ﬁt from separating, namely, avoiding the under-valuation of its securities due
to asymmetric information, is greater than the cost of doing so (namely, incurring a bankruptcy cost with a
certain probability). Recall that, the bankruptcy (low-cash-ﬂow) probability of the type G is always lower
for the type G than for the type M, so that the expected cost of issuing debt is always lower for the type G
than for the type M. At the same time, since δ ≥ δ, the diﬀerence in the low cash ﬂow probability between
the type G and type M (as well as the type B) ﬁrm is signiﬁcant. Therefore, the diﬀerence in the intrinsic
values of these types of ﬁrms is large enough that pooling with the other two ﬁrm types imposes large costs
20o nt h et y p eGﬁrm. As a result, the type G ﬁrm ﬁnds it advantageous to separate from the other ﬁrm types
by issuing debt.
In the following proposition, we denote by V 0
GMB the expected value of a ﬁrm at t=0 if all three types of
ﬁrms pool by issuing mandatory convertibles at time 0; and by V 1
GMB the expected value of a ﬁrm at t=1 if
all three types issue mandatory convertibles at time 0, and the ﬁrm does not deteriorate at time 1.
Proposition 3 (Mandatory Convertibles in a Fully Pooling Equilibrium) If any one of the following
two conditions hold:
(a) If the probability of deterioration of the type M and type G ﬁrms, φ1, is larger than a certain threshold
value φ,o ri fδ<δ, so that the type M and type G ﬁrms’ low cash ﬂow probabilities are not too far
apart; or
(b) If the extent of asymmetric information facing the ﬁrm is small enough, so that a ≤ a.
then all three types of ﬁrms issue mandatory convertibles at t=0. Upon maturity, the convertibles will be
converted to a fraction n∗
m ≥ I−xL
V 0
GMB−xL of the ﬁrm’s equity mandatorily, with the value of the equity exchanged




GMB. The dividends D∗ on these mandatory convertibles will be
set equal to xL.19
When φ1 ≥ φ, the probability of bankruptcy of the type G is large enough that the cost to the type G
of separating from the type M and the type B (and thus ensuing that it is correctly valued in the securities
market) is overwhelmed by the expected bankruptcy cost it incurs by issuing debt. At the same time, if
δ<δ, the diﬀerence in the low cash ﬂow probability between the type G and type M ﬁrms is small enough so
that their intrinsic values are also close. This, in turn, means that the cost to the type G of pooling with the
type M is not too large. As a result, the type G ﬁrm ﬁnds it advantageous to pool with the type M and the
type B by issuing mandatory convertibles, rather than separating from the other two types by issuing debt.
Further, the type G ﬁrm prefers to issue mandatory convertibles rather than equity to pool with the other
two types. The intuition underlying this preference is the same as that discussed in detail in the context of
the type M pooling with the type B in the previous proposition, and arises from the fact that the cap of the
mandatory convertible makes its market value less sensitive to asymmetric information than that of equity.
Thus, the type G maximizes:




)(xH − D), (11)
19 Outsiders’ beliefs regarding the probability of the ﬁrm types remain unchanged.
21subject to the break-even constraint of investors:





GMB − D)Prob(no deterioration) + D ≥ I. (12)
The type M’s problem is similar to that discussed under the previous proposition; it also prefers to pool
with the type G and the type B in equilibrium by issuing mandatory convertibles, for the reason discussed
under proposition 2.
Proposition 4 (Announcement Eﬀects of Mandatory Convertibles) The abnormal equity return
upon announcement of an issue of mandatory convertibles is zero or negative. In particular, when mandatory
convertibles are issued as part of a fully pooling equilibrium, the abnormal equity return upon announcement
of issuing mandatory convertibles is zero; it is negative when mandatory convertibles are issued as part of a
partially pooling equilibrium.20
As we saw before, mandatory convertibles are issued as part of either a fully pooling or a partially pooling
equilibrium. In the case of a fully pooling equilibrium, no information about ﬁrm type is conveyed to the
market by the issue of a mandatory convertible, so that the announcement eﬀect is zero. In the case of a
partially pooling equilibrium, only the type M and type B issue mandatory convertibles, so that the market
re-values the ﬁrm (and its equity) downward to reﬂect this new information (recall that the market value of
the ﬁrm prior to the issue would be the average of the values of the type G, type M and type B ﬁrms).
4 Equilibrium Design of Mandatory Convertibles
In this section, we will analyze in detail the equilibrium design of mandatory convertibles. Due to space
considerations, we discuss here only the case of a fully pooling equilibrium. However, the analysis is similar
in the case of a partial pooling equilibrium.21 In this section, we relax our earlier assumption that n =1
and d =1 ; we now allow for n ≤ 1 and d ≤ 1.
Proposition 5 (Equilibrium Design of Mandatory Convertibles) In a fully pooling equilibrium where
all three types of ﬁrms issue mandatory convertibles:
(a) The type G ﬁrm sets the exchange ratio nm such that n∗
m = n (i.e., the highest possible); the dividend
D such that D∗ = dxL (the highest possible); and the cap on the mandatory convertible U∗
m is such
that it is the lowest possible.
20 It can be shown that, when γ3 < γ, the announcement of issuing ordinary convertibles results in a negative abnormal
equity return upon announcement of the issue. Given ordinary convertible is not the focus of our paper, we choose not to
discuss this in detail.
21 Details of this analysis is available to interested readers upon request.
22(b) U∗
m is a function of n and d (given in the appendix). It is decreasing with d and n.
(c) In particular, if d =1and n =1 ,t h e nD∗ = xL,a n dU∗








In the fully pooling equilibrium, the type G ﬁrm designs the mandatory convertible optimally to mini-
mize its cost of pooling with the type M and the type B ﬁrms. The pooling cost arises because investors
are not aware of the type of the ﬁrm and thus price the ﬁrm according to their prior beliefs. Therefore, to
minimize this pooling cost, the mandatory convertible is designed to be minimally aﬀected by the asym-
metric information in the securities market. This is accomplished by lowering the cap Um of the mandatory
convertible and raising the exchange ratio nm.W h e nt h i si sd o n e ,t h ed i ﬀerence in the expected payment
to investors in the high and the low cash ﬂow scenarios is reduced. This reduces the diﬀerence between the
intrinsic values of the mandatory convertibles issued by the three types of ﬁrms so that the market value of
the mandatory convertible become less sensitive to the eﬀects of asymmetric information. Of course, when
the investors’ upside is capped, they have to be compensated for this through a higher dividend, so that they
break even on their investment in the ﬁrm (i.e., constraint (10) is satisﬁed). Since, as long as D ≤ dxL,t h e
ﬁrm is able to pay investors the promised amount with probability 1 regardless of ﬁrm type, dividends are
unaﬀected by asymmetric information, so that the net eﬀect of setting the cap Um as low as possible, and
the exchange ratio nm and the dividend D as high as possible is to minimize the sensitivity of the market
value of the convertible to the eﬀects of asymmetric information.22 In other words, lowering the cap Um and
raising nm reduces the subsidization of the type M and the type B ﬁrms by the type G, thereby reducing the
extent of under-valuation of the type G ﬁrm’s mandatory convertibles due to asymmetric information. In
the following, we discuss a numerical example demonstrating parts (a), (b), and (c) of the above proposition.
Numerical Examples:S e tδ, the probability of the low cash ﬂow if there is no deterioration at t=1, equal to
0.5; the probabilities of deterioration of the type G and M, φ1 =0 .5 and that of type B φ2 =0 .8; the prior
22 For analytical simplicity, we focus only on the case where D ≤ dxL so that the dividends are sure cash ﬂows and therefore
unaﬀected by asymmetric information. As long as there is no uncertainty associated with dividends, lowering the cap and
increasing the dividends unambiguously reduces the sensitivity of the market value of the mandatory convertible to asymmetric
information. Of course, ﬁrms can lower the cap on the mandatory convertible even more by promising investors additional
(uncertain) cash ﬂows as dividends, i.e., they can set D>dxL. However, in this case, the additional dividends are aﬀected by
asymmetric information, so that the eﬀect of doing this on the sensitivity of the market value of the mandatory convertible to
asymmetric information is ambiguous.
23beliefs γ1 =0 .5, γ2 =0 .3,a n dγ3 =0 .2;t h ec a s hﬂows xH = $100 and xL = $20; and the investment I = $20.
Further, let d =0 .5 and n =1 . In this case, all three types of ﬁrms pool by issuing mandatory convertibles,
selling it to investors at $20, thus raising the full investment amount. The mandatory convertibles will be
designed optimally such that the exchange ratio n∗
m is 1;t h ec a pU∗
m is $31.2; and the dividends D∗ is $10
(thus maximizing the expected t=2 payoﬀ of the type G ﬁrm; this payoﬀ is $27.33). Consider now a second
example, with d =0 .75, and keeping all other parameters the same as before. Then, all three types of ﬁrms
would pool by issuing mandatory convertibles, optimally designed such that the exchange ratio n∗
m =1 ;t h e
cap U∗
m = $23.68; and the dividends D∗ = $15. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h et y p eGﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is $28.02.
Finally, consider a third example where d =1 , with all other parameters remaining the same as before. In
this case, the equilibrium design of the mandatory convertibles issued by the ﬁrm is such that the exchange
ratio n∗
m =1 ;t h ec a pU∗
m = $15; and the dividends D∗ = $20. I nt h i sc a s e ,t h et y p eGﬁrm’s expected
payoﬀ is $33.14. Notice from the above three examples that as the cash constraint d on the ﬁrm is relaxed
(so that the ﬁrm is able to pay out more and more of its time 2 lower cash ﬂow as dividends), it optimally
sets a lower and lower cap on the mandatory convertible. Further, notice that, as the ﬁrm sets a lower cap,
the subsidization of the lower ﬁrm types by the type G ﬁrm is reduced, thus increasing the expected payoﬀ
to type G ﬁrm insiders.
5 Implications and Testable Hypotheses
Our model generates several testable implications. We will now describe three of these implications and
develop several hypotheses for our empirical tests.
1. Choice between ordinary versus mandatory convertibles and the probability of bankruptcy: Our model
implies that, in a sample of ﬁrms issuing either ordinary or mandatory convertibles, those ﬁrms with a larger
ex-ante bankruptcy probability (on average) will issue mandatory convertibles while those with a smaller
bankruptcy probability will issue ordinary convertibles.23 As we saw from proposition 2 and 3, when
their bankruptcy probability is high, higher-valued ﬁrms prefer to pool with lower-valued ﬁrms by issuing
23 While our model has implications for other pairs of securities as well, we focus our empirical tests a sample of ﬁrms which
have chosen to issue either mandatory or straight convertibles.
24mandatory convertibles, for the reasons discussed under Proposition 2. In contrast, when their bankruptcy
probability is low, higher-valued ﬁrms prefer to distinguish themselves from lower-valued ones by issuing other
securities, such as ordinary convertibles or straight debt (as discussed under proposition 1.) Therefore, in a
sample of ﬁrms issuing either mandatory or ordinary convertibles, those with a smaller ex-ante bankruptcy
probability on average will issue ordinary convertibles and those with a larger bankruptcy probability will
issue mandatory convertibles. This will be the ﬁrst hypothesis (H1)w et e s tl a t e r . W ew i l lu s es t a n d a r d
proxies for the bankruptcy probability such as the Altman’s z-score to test this hypothesis: ﬁrms with a
larger z-score (smaller bankruptcy probability) issue ordinary convertibles while those with a smaller z-score
(larger bankruptcy probability) issue mandatory convertibles.24
2. Choice between ordinary versus mandatory convertibles and the extent of asymmetric information:I na
sample of ﬁrms issuing either ordinary convertibles or mandatory convertibles, those ﬁrms facing a smaller
extent of asymmetric information are more likely to issue mandatory convertibles, and those facing a greater
extent of asymmetric information are more likely to issue ordinary convertibles. This implication also follows
directly from proposition 1, 2, and 3. This will be the second hypothesis (H2) we test later. To test this
hypothesis, we will make use of standard proxies for asymmetric information such as ﬁrm size, number of
analysts following a ﬁrm, standard deviation of analysts forecasts, forecast error, etc.25
3. The announcement eﬀect of issuing mandatory convertibles: The abnormal equity return upon the
announcement of the issue of mandatory convertibles is zero (in a fully pooling equilibrium) or negative (in
a partially pooling equilibrium). Further, this announcement eﬀect is decreasing (i.e., is more negative),
with ex-ante probability of bankruptcy of the issuing ﬁrm on average. The ﬁrst implication above follows
directly from proposition 4. The second implication follows from proposition 2 and 3. We know from
these propositions that as the diﬀerence in the ex-ante bankruptcy probability between higher and lower
intrinsic value ﬁrms is larger, mandatory convertibles are more likely to be issued in a partially pooling
24 In the context of testing our model, we can split up the true bankruptcy probability of any given ﬁrm into two parts: a
publicly observable component (common to all ﬁrm types and therefore reﬂecting the average bankruptcy probability across
ﬁrm types) and an independent component which is private information to ﬁrm insiders. Since proxies such as the Altman’s
z-score are computed using only publicly available information, they will capture only the ﬁrst component, namely, the average
bankruptcy probability across ﬁrm types.
25 We will discuss these proxies of asymmetric information in detail in the next section.
25equilibrium (negative announcement eﬀect) rather than in a fully pooling equilibrium (zero announcement
eﬀect). Further, whenever the average bankruptcy probability across ﬁrm types increases, the bankruptcy
probability of lower intrinsic-value ﬁrms is likely to increase faster than that of higher intrinsic-value ﬁrms,
resulting in a larger diﬀerence between the bankruptcy probabilities of higher and lower intrinsic-value
ﬁrms.26 Thus, the likelihood of mandatory convertibles being issued in a partially pooling equilibrium (and
therefore a more negative announcement eﬀect) is increasing in the average ex-ante bankruptcy probability
(as measured by standard proxies like the Altman’s z-score). This is the third hypothesis (H3) we test later.
4. The operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers: If mandatory convertibles are issued in
a fully pooling equilibrium (where all three types of ﬁrms issue mandatory convertibles) as characterized
in proposition 3, then the long-term operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers should not
underperform a sample of comparable non-issuers. On the other hand, if mandatory convertibles are issued
as part of a partially pooling equilibrium, as characterized in proposition 2, where only lower quality ﬁrms
issue mandatory convertibles, then mandatory convertible issuers would underperform relative to a sample
of comparable non-issuers in terms of long-term operating performance.27 Therefore, the fourth hypothesis
(H4) we test is that the long-term operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers is not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from that of a matched sample of non-issuers.
6 Empirical Evidence
6.1 Data and Sample Selection
We identify new issues of ordinary convertibles and mandatory convertibles between 1991 to 2001 from Secu-
rities Data Corporation’s (SDC Platinum) New Issues Database. Our initial sample included 133 mandatory
convertibles and 710 ordinary convertibles. We obtained the ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics relating to the
26 When economic conditions worsen, so that the average bankruptcy probability across ﬁrms increases, lower intrinsic value
ﬁrms are likely to be aﬀected much more than higher intrinsic value ﬁrms. Compared with lower intrinsic value ﬁrms, higher
intrinsic value ﬁrms are likely to have a larger cushion which would prevent them from facing ﬁnancial diﬃculties under a wider
range of economic conditions.
27 Note that if mandatory convertible issuers indeed have private information at the time of issue about their ﬁrms’ future
performance, this negative prediction will be realized over the coming years in terms of poor operating performance relative to
a matched sample of non-issuers.
26issuer’s ﬁnancial position from the issuer’s annual report data on Compustat.28 This left us with a sample
of 325 ordinary convertibles and 124 mandatory convertibles, as we had to omit those issues that we could
not match to the Compustat data.
Details of each convertible issue were then collected from its prospectus; propectuses were obtained
from the Global Access database. We eliminated the issues of ordinary and mandatory convertibles where
the primary motive for their issuance was to obtain tax beneﬁts or where the mandatory convertible was
synthetically created by an investment bank.29 Since our focus is on mandatory convertibles involving
primary distribution of equity, we also eliminated 14 mandatory convertible issues where the equity that was
being oﬀered upon conversion belonged to another ﬁrm.30 After eliminating these issues, we were left with
a sample of 220 ordinary convertibles and 78 mandatory convertibles.
The information asymmetry measures required for our empirical analysis were obtained from the IBES
database. IBES reports a mean, median, and standard deviation of forecasts for each ﬁr mb a s e do nt h e
analysts’ estimates that are submitted that month. We also excluded from our sample those issues where
data on some key variables required for our empirical analysis was missing in the Compustat and IBES
databases. Finally, some observations were removed from the sample when data ﬁltering indicated extreme
values likely to be associated with data reporting or recording errors. This eﬀectively left us with a sample
of about 153 ordinary convertible and 41 mandatory convertible issues.31 Our sample consists of 12
28 The annual report data from Compustat was matched in the following manner. For a given issue date we linked up that
ﬁrm’s annual report data for the ﬁscal year end immediately preceding the issue date. For example if the issue date was March
1995 and the ﬁrm’s ﬁscal year end was December, we matched this ﬁrm to its annual report of December 1994.
29 Example of an ordinary convertible which is designed primarily to provide tax beneﬁts to the issuer is LYONs (Liquid
Yield Option Notes). The issuer receives continuous tax beneﬁts after issuance until the holder exchanges the LYONs for
shares, if it occurs. An example of mandatory convertible is the Participating Hybrid Option Note Exchangeable Securities
(PHONES) which was ﬁrst issued in early 1999. The economic advantages for the issuance of this security is completely driven
by the potential tax beneﬁts resulting from the taxation treatment of the structure under U.S. tax laws. Example of a synthetic
mandatory convertible is the Structured Yield Products Exchangeable for Stock (STRYPES) designed by Merrill Lynch. The
key element of the structure is that it does not entail an issue by the issuer whose equity underlies the transaction, instead the
issue is undertaken by an investment bank or by using a special-purpose ﬁnancing vehicle such as a trust.
30 A speciﬁc example of such a secondary distribution of equity in a mandatory convertible security is the issue of DECS by
American Express on October 1993, which was to be mandatorily converted on October 1996 to shares of FDC common stock,
w h i c hw e r eh e l db yA m e r i c a nE x p r e s s .
31 Our sample thus comprises of ordinary convertibles which are either debt or preferred stock and 12 variations of mandatory
convertibles which convert into the equity of the ﬁrm issuing the convertible, and where the primary reason for the issue is not
tax driven. Out of the ordinary convertibles in our sample, we have about 120 issues of ordinary convertible debt and about 30
issues of convertible preferred stock. In our econometric analysis we have clubbed them together and refer to them as ordinary
convertibles.
27diﬀerent variations of mandatory convertibles which have been designed and created by various investment
banks. The variations of mandatory convertible securities which are present in our ﬁnal sample are: ACES,
DECS, EQUITY SECURITY UNITS, FELINE PRIDES, MARCS, MEDS, PEPS, PERCS, PIES, PRIDES,
TAPS, and TRACES. Even though these mandatory convertible variations diﬀer in their speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ
structures as well as some other provisions, certain fundamental features are common to all of them, as we
brieﬂy discussed in the introduction to this paper. First, all of them mandatorily convert to equity at the
maturity of the convertible (as against conversion to equity at the option of the security holder in the case of
ordinary convertibles). Second, the dividend yield on them is typically higher than that on the underlying
common stock. Third, all these mandatory convertibles have either a capped or limited appreciation potential
compared to the underlying common stock.
The stock price information required for our empirical analysis of announcement eﬀects related to the
issuance of mandatory convertible securities, and long run abnormal stock performance of mandatory con-
vertible issuers was obtained from the CRSP database. Thus, our sample of 220 ordinary and 78 mandatory
convertibles had to satisfy an additional data requirement. They had to have data available on the CRSP
database for a period of one year prior to their issue. About 200 issues of ordinary convertibles and 70 issues
of mandatory convertibles met this requirement. We use the ﬁling date of the issues as recorded by SDC
as the announcement date; in nearly all the cases the ﬁrst public announcement of the issues in either The
Wall Street Journal, the Lexis-Nexis database, or the Dow Jones Newswire coincided with the ﬁling date of
t h ei s s u e sa sr e c o r d e db yS D C . 32
32 One advantage of using the ﬁl i n gd a t ea st h ea n n o u n c e m e n td a t ei st h a tw ea r ea b l et ok e e pt h o s ei s s u e sw h i c hw e r en o t
reported in either The Wall Street Journal, the Lexis-Nexis database, or the Dow Jones Newswire. Prior studies which have
used the registration date of securities to calculate the announcement eﬀects are Best (1994), and Best and Best (1995) among
others.
286.2 Choice between Mandatory and Ordinary Convertibles
6.2.1 Measurement of Information Asymmetry, Bankruptcy Probability, and Control Vari-
ables
Following Christie (1987), Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), and Clarke and Shastri (2001), we use
four diﬀerent measures of information asymmetry in our empirical analysis.33 The ﬁrst measure is the
number of analysts following the ﬁrm (NUMA). Firms with higher analyst following can be expected to have
a lower degree of information asymmetry. The second measure is the error in earnings forecast (FORERR).
We measure forecast error as the ratio of the absolute diﬀerence between the forecasted earnings and the
actual earnings per share to the price per share at the end of the ﬁscal year.34 Firms with a higher forecast
error are expected to have a greater extent of information asymmetry. Our third measure of information
asymmetry is the standard deviation of analyst forecasts (STDEV), and our fourth measure is the coeﬃcient
of variation of analyst forecasts (COVAR), which is deﬁned as the ratio of STDEV to the absolute value of the
mean estimate for that month. Both STDEV and COVAR denote the dispersion among analysts regarding
the earnings estimate of the ﬁrm for that month. Since a higher STDEV or(and) a higher COVAR represents
greater disagreement among the analysts, it is associated with ﬁrms having a greater degree of information
asymmetry.
Our measure of the probability of bankruptcy at the time of the security issue is constructed following
MacKie-Mason (1990). We use the Z-score (ZSCR) calculated from Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy prediction
model as a proxy for the issuing ﬁrm’s bankruptcy probability. Z-score is deﬁned as (3.3*EBIT/SALE +
1.0*SALE/TA + 1.4*RE/TA + 1.2*WC/TA + 0.6*MKVALF/DT) where EBIT is earnings before interest
and taxes, SALE is total sales, RE is the retained earnings, WC is working capital, and DT is book value
of debt. Firms with higher Z-scores have a lower probability of bankruptcy, while those with lower Z-scores
have a higher probability of bankruptcy.35
33 In computing the measures of information asymmetry involving analyst forecasts, we use the forecasts of these analysts in
the ﬁnal month of the ﬁscal year immediately preceeding the issue date of the convertible.
34 The mean monthly earnings forecast for the last month of that ﬁscal year is deﬁned as forecasted earnings.
35 We also consider the leverage of the ﬁrm at the time of issue as an additional proxy for bankruptcy in checking the
robustness of our empirical results. Leverage (LEVG)i sd e ﬁned as DT/(TA+MKVALF- CEQ).
29In addition to measures for information asymmetry and bankruptcy probability, we use four control vari-
a b l e si no u rt e s t sw h i c hm a ya ﬀect ﬁrms’ choice between issuing ordinary versus mandatory convertible secu-
rities. We use ﬁrm size (FSZE)a so u rﬁrst control variable. Firm size is deﬁned as Ln(100*(TA+MKVALF-
CEQ) where TA is the book value of total assets, MKVALF is the market value of equity of the ﬁrm at ﬁscal
year end, and CEQ is the book value of common equity.36 However, prior literature (e.g., see Ritter, 1984)
suggests that ﬁrm size may also be considered as a proxy for information asymmetry, since, more informa-
tion is usually available to outsiders about larger ﬁrms, implying that larger ﬁrms should be associated with
less information asymmetry. Second, we control for the market-to-book ratio of the issuing ﬁrm (MKBK),
which is deﬁned as (TA+MKVALF- CEQ)/TA. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios have more growth
opportunities, and also often a higher extent of information asymmetry associated with these growth op-
portunities. Third, we construct a dummy variable (SYND) to denote whether the convertible issue was
syndicated or not. This variable takes the value 1 if the issue was syndicated by a group of underwriters,
and 0 otherwise. While we use SYND as a control variable, whether a security issue is syndicated or not is
likely to have an eﬀect, among other things, on the extent of information asymmetry facing the ﬁrm in the
securities market.37 We also control for ﬁnancial institutions in our sample that have issued ordinary or
mandatory convertible securities. We construct a dummy variable (FIN) which takes the value of 1 if the
issuer was a ﬁnancial institution, and 0 otherwise.
6.2.2 Univariate Analysis
In this sub-section we discuss our empirical methodology, and present the results of our empirical tests on the
choice of ﬁrms between issuing ordinary versus mandatory convertible securities, i.e., hypotheses H1 and H2.
In our univariate tests, we report the diﬀerences in the mean and median ﬁrm characteristics between ﬁrms
36 We also conducted our empirical tests using alternate proxies for the ﬁrm size (FSZE)v a r i a b l e ;s u c ha sL n ( TA)a n d
Ln(SALE). The results remain invariant to the choice of the FSZE proxy.
37 See, e.g., the analysis of Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), who demonstrate that as the reputation of the underwriter is
greater, the more credibly he is able to communicate the ﬁrm’s value to the securities market, thereby lowering the extent of
information asymmetry facing the ﬁrm. It is reasonable to expect that a syndicate of investment banks serving as underwriter
would have greater reputation and would therefore be able to perform this function more eﬀectively.
30that issued mandatory convertibles and those that issued ordinary convertibles.38 Based on H1, we expect
that ﬁrms issuing ordinary convertibles should have a higher ZSCR and lower LEVG (smaller bankruptcy
probability), while ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles should have a relatively smaller ZSCR and higher
LEVG (higher bankruptcy probability). Based on our hypothesis H2, we expect that ﬁrms issuing ordinary
convertibles should have a greater extent of asymmetric information, i.e., higher FORERR, STDEV, COVAR,
and MKBK,a n dal o w e rv a l u ef o rNUMA, FSZE,a n dSYND;w h i l eﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles
should have a smaller extent of asymmetric information, i.e., lower FORERR, STDEV, COVAR,a n dMKBK,
and a higher value for NUMA, FSZE,a n dSYND. Ap r i o r iwe do not have any expectations about the value
for FIN.
Panel A of table 1 reports the results from the univariate tests of H1. As expected, we ﬁnd that the
ZSCR and LEVG variables are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent at the 1% level between the two groups, in both the
t- t e s ta n dt h eW i l c o x o nr a n k - s u mt e s t . T h i sr e s u l ti sthus consistent with our hypothesis H1, suggesting
that ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles have a higher ex-ante probability of bankruptcy. Speciﬁcally, the
mean ZSCR for ordinary convertible issuers is four times higher than that of mandatory convertible issuers
(12.02 versus 3.23), and mandatory convertible issuers on average have a LEVG 33% higher than the LEVG
of ordinary convertible issuers (25.8% versus 19.4%).
Panel B of table 1 reports the results from the univariate tests of H2. Consistent with H2, we ﬁnd that
NUMA is higher for ﬁrms that issued mandatory convertibles and the diﬀerence with ordinary convertible
issuers is signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to both the tests. Firms that issued mandatory convertibles
had on average 17 analysts following them compared to 10 analysts following ordinary convertible issuers.
Thus, ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles have more analysts following them, and hence are associated
with a lower degree of information asymmetry compared to ﬁrms issuing ordinary convertibles. As predicted
by H2, we also ﬁnd that ﬁnancial analysts make less error in the earnings forecasts and are also less likely to
disagree with each other regarding earnings forecasts of mandatory convertible issuers. FORERR, STDEV,
38 We use the t-test for the diﬀerence in means and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z-statistic) for the diﬀerence in the
distributions of the two samples of convertible issues. We also conducted a Chi2 test for the diﬀerence in medians, which is not
reported in Table 1 for space reasons. The signiﬁcance level of the variables remain unaltered when using the Chi2 test.
31and COVAR have lower means for the mandatory convertible issuers than for ordinary convertible issuers,
with the diﬀerence in the mean of FORERR being signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Further, FORERR and COVAR
have lower medians for mandatory convertible issuers compared to ordinary convertible issuers. These results
again suggest a lower degree of information asymmetry for ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles compared
to ordinary convertible issuers.
Panel C of table 1 reports the univariate comparisons of the control variables. Consistent with H2, FSZE
is higher for ﬁrms that issued mandatory convertibles and the diﬀerence with ordinary convertible issuers is
signiﬁcant at the 1% level according to both the tests. The average value of FSZE for mandatory convertible
issuers was 22% larger than ordinary convertible issuers. Again, consistent with H2, MKBK is lower for
mandatory convertible issuers and the diﬀerence is signiﬁcant at the 1% level in both the t-test and the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test, suggesting that ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles have lower growth related
information asymmetry. The average MKBK for ordinary convertible issuers is 1.92, about 36% higher
than that of mandatory convertible issuers which is 1.41. Also, as predicted by H2, the syndication variable
SYND, is higher for ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles (about 63.4% of mandatory convertible issues are
syndicated compared to 21.6% of ordinary convertible issues), and the diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant at the 1%
level in both the tests. Only the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (Z-statistic) is signiﬁcant for the ﬁnancial dummy
FIN,w i t ht h et-test showing no diﬀerence between the ordinary and mandatory convertible issuers.
6.2.3 Multivariate Analysis
In our multivariate analysis, we examine which ﬁrm characteristics inﬂuence the choice of the convertible
security that the ﬁrm issues, and to do so we employ a multinomial logistic regression framework. We ﬁrst
categorize ﬁrms according to the type of convertible security that they issued, which we obtained from the
SDC database. We construct our dependent variable TYPE which takes the value of 1 if the security issued
by a ﬁrm is a mandatory convertible security or 0 if the security issued is an ordinary convertible security.
The independent variables used are ﬁrm speciﬁc proxies of information asymmetry, bankruptcy probability,









where INFO is the set of variables measuring the degree of information asymmetry associated with the issuing
ﬁrm constructed from analysts’ estimates, i.e., it consists of NUMA, FORERR, STDEV, and COVAR.B a s e d
on H1, we predict that the coeﬃcient on ZSCR should be negative since ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles
should have smaller values of ZSCR (higher bankruptcy probability). Following H2, we expect that the
coeﬃcients of NUMA, FSZE,a n dSYND should be positive, while the coeﬃcients of FORERR, STDEV,
COVAR,a n dMKBK should be negative, as ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles should face a smaller
extent of asymmetric information. Ap r i o r iwe do not have an expectation on the sign of the coeﬃcient on
FIN.
The results of this multivariate analysis are presented in Table 2. In regressions 1 through 5, we introduce
the four information asymmetry measures one by one separately, together with the proxy of bankruptcy
probability ZSCR, while controlling for FSZE, MKBK, SYND, and FIN in all the diﬀerent speciﬁcations.
As expected, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of ZSCR is negative and signiﬁcant in all ﬁve regressions. We also
ﬁnd that the coeﬃcients on all four information asymmetry measures have the expected signs. However, the
coeﬃcient of NUMA is negative and insigniﬁcant in the ﬁrst regression, which may result from the signiﬁcant
correlation between NUMA and FSZE. Thus, in regression 2, we exclude FSZE from the regression, and
the coeﬃcient of NUMA becomes positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level as expected. The coeﬃcients on
FORERR and COVAR are also signiﬁcant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively, while the coeﬃcient on
STDEV is insigniﬁcant.
Then, in regression 6, we introduce all the asymmetric information proxies together.39 Our results show
that the coeﬃcient on ZSCR is negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with H1,
39 We include one measure between STDEV and COVAR in the regression as they both reﬂect the level of disagreement
among the analysts’ estimates. The results remain invariant to the choice of the variable.
33suggesting that ﬁrms facing a higher bankruptcy probability are more likely to issue mandatory convertibles,
compared to ordinary convertibles.40 Our results also show that the coeﬃcients on FORERR and COVAR
are negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% and 5% level respectively, suggesting that ﬁrms facing a lower extent
of information asymmetry are more likely to issue mandatory convertibles. These results are consistent with
our prediction from H2. However, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient on NUMA is insigniﬁcant. As we discussed
before, this insigniﬁcance may be caused by the multicollinearity between NUMA and FSZE.
In addition, we also ﬁnd the coeﬃcient on FSZE, FIN and SYND are signiﬁcantly positive in all the spec-
iﬁcations. These results conﬁrm our ﬁndings in the univariate test, suggesting that ﬁrms issuing mandatory
convertibles are more likely to have larger ﬁrm size, the probability of issuing a mandatory convertible rather
than an ordinary convertible is greater for a ﬁnancial ﬁrm, and that an issue of mandatory convertibles is
more likely to be syndicated than one of ordinary convertibles.41
6.3 Announcement Eﬀects of Mandatory Convertibles
In this sub-section we present the results of the average abnormal returns experienced by ﬁrms upon an-
nouncement of a mandatory convertible issue. To compute the cumulative abnormal returns for each issuer,
we employ the standard event-study methodology. We obtain parameter estimates for the market model
over a period of 250 trading days, starting from 296 days prior and ending on the 46th day prior to the
announcement date of the convertible issue. We then calculated the cumulative abnormal returns for ﬁrm
i for the diﬀerent event windows ranging from 3 days before to 3 days after the announcement day. For
example the cumulative abnormal return of the ith ﬁrm, CARi for the [-1, +1] event window is deﬁned
as CARi = ARi,−1 + ARi,0 + ARi,+1, the sum of the abnormal returns for ﬁrm i for the day prior to the
40 As a robustness check we also used LEVG as a proxy for the probability of bankruptcy. However, since LEVG may be
systematically related to information asymmetry and other ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics in the model, we use an instrumental
variable approach in endogenising LEVG. We then re-estimated all the regressions using endogenized LEVG as the proxy for
bankruptcy probability. The results are identical to those presented in Table 2. The coeﬃcient on LEVG is positive and
signiﬁcant in all the regression speciﬁcations. Thus, ﬁrms having higher leverage have a higher probability of issuing mandatory
convertibles.
41 We have also conducted our empirical analysis separately for each category of ordinary convertibles, i.e., convertible debt
and convertible preferred stock. The results obtained for each category are similar to the ones that are reported in this paper.
Out of the two samples of ordinary convertibles, the results for the preferred stock sample are somewhat weaker than the debt
sample. However, our hypothesis relating the information asymmetry measures and the choice between ordinary and mandatory
convertibles are also supported in the preferred stock sample.
34announcement day, the announcement day, and the day after the announcement day.
Based on our hypothesis H3, we expect that the average CAR for mandatory convertible issuers upon
announcement of the issue (announcement eﬀect) will be either zero (in a fully pooling equilibrium) or
negative (in a partially pooling equilibrium). In order to test this hypothesis, we ﬁrst conduct a t-test
the null hypothesis that the announcement eﬀect of mandatory convertible issuers is equal to zero. Then,
we split our sample of mandatory convertible issues by their ZSCR (bankruptcy probability) at the time
of announcement of the issue. We expect that issuers with high ZSCR (low bankruptcy probability) have
a zero CAR, and issuers with low ZSCR (high bankruptcy probability) have a negative CAR upon the
announcement of the issue.
Table 3 reports the results of the average abnormal returns experienced by ﬁrms upon announcement of
mandatory convertible issues. As shown in the ﬁrst column of Panel A, ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles
on average experience -0.7% abnormal return on the announcement date (event window [0]), and this an-
nouncement eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. We also ﬁnd that the announcement eﬀects are insigniﬁcant
in the other event windows, although the average CAR in these windows is negative and around -0.4%.42
These results are consistent with H3.
We then categorized mandatory convertible issuers into two groups: those with a high ZSCR (above
median) and those with low ZSCR (below median). The other columns of panel A in table 3 reports the
announcement eﬀects of these two groups and the diﬀerence in the announcement eﬀect between these
two groups. We ﬁnd that, in a sample of ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles, ﬁrms with high ZSCR
(low bankruptcy probability) have on average zero (i.e., insigniﬁcant) announcement eﬀect for all event
windows, while ﬁrms with low ZSCR (high bankruptcy probability) on average have signiﬁcantly negative
announcement eﬀects for all event windows except [-3, 0]. In particular, the mean CARsf o ri s s u e r sw i t hl o w
ZSCR in event window [0], [-1, 0], [-1, +1], and [-3, +3] are -0.9%, -1.2%, -1.7% and -1.9% respectively, and
42 In results not reported here we have also calculated the abnormal returns experienced upon the announcement of ordinary
convertible debt issues. Firms issuing ordinary convertibles have a signiﬁcantly negative announcement eﬀect for all the event
windows that we have considered. The mean CAR for all ordinary convertible issuers is around -1.1%. For the ﬁrst three event
windows they are signiﬁcantly negative at the 1% level, while for the last two they are signiﬁcantly negative at the 5% level.
These results are consistent with announcement eﬀect results upon the issuance of ordinary convertibles as documented in the
literature previously. See Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986), and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) among others.
35all these CARsa r es i g n i ﬁcant at the 1% level. In comparison, the mean CARs for issuers with high ZSCR
in these event windows are -0.6%, 0.4%, 0.5%, and 0.6% respectively, and all are insigniﬁcant. Further,
our results also show that the diﬀerence in the average abnormal returns between the high ZSCR and low
ZSCR samples is signiﬁcant for event windows [-1, 0], [-1 +1], and [-3, +3] at either the 5% level or the 10%
level. These results are again consistent with our hypothesis H3. They suggest that issuers with high ZSCR
experience zero announcement eﬀect, while issuers with low ZSCR have signiﬁcantly negative announcement
eﬀects.
In order to ensure our results on announcement eﬀect is robust to the diﬀerent methods of sample
categorization, we further categorize our sample of mandatory convertible issuers into 3 groups: those with
high ZSCR (top 1/3rd), medium ZSCR ( middle 1/3rd), and low ZSCR (bottom 1/3rd). The results from
this robustness check are presented in panel B of table 3. In general, in a sample of mandatory convertible
issuers, the magnitude of the announcement eﬀect is zero for the ﬁrms with high ZSCR (low bankruptcy
probability) and signiﬁcantly negative for the ﬁrms with low ZSCR (high bankruptcy probability), while it is
mixed for the ﬁrms with medium ZSCR (medium bankruptcy probability) which is either zero or signiﬁcantly
negative. Speciﬁcally, in event window [-1, 0], the mean CAR is -1.4% for the issuers with low ZSCR;i ti s
-0.4% for the issuers medium ZSCR; and it is 0.5% for issuers with high ZSCR.A n dt h et-statistics shows
that the diﬀerence in CAR between the high ZSCR and the low ZSCR samples in event window [-1, 0] is
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. Thus, the results here are similar to those presented in panel A of table 3, and
are consistent with hypothesis H3.
Finally, since some mandatory convertible issuers in our sample had concurrent equity and debt issues,
we conduct another robustness check of our results of H3 by excluding those ﬁrms that had concurrent
issues. The results from this robustness check are presented in table 4. In particular, in panel A of table
4, we report the average abnormal returns of mandatory convertible issuers after excluding ﬁrms that had
concurrent equity issues, and in Panel B, we exclude ﬁrms that had either concurrent equity or concurrent
debt issues. As shown in table 4, after excluding concurrent issues, the announcement eﬀect (the average
CARs) on the entire sample becomes signiﬁcantly negative for most of the event windows. However, after
36we separate the sample by ZSCR, the results are similar to those presented in table 3. The average CARso f
ﬁrms with low ZSCR are mostly signiﬁcantly negative, whereas it is mostly zero for ﬁrms with high ZSCR.I n
summary, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are generally consistent with our hypothesis H3 regarding
the announcement eﬀect experienced by ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles.43
6.4 The Operating Performance of Mandatory Convertible Issuers
In this sub-section we empirically study the operating performance of ﬁrms that have issued mandatory
convertibles relative to a matched set of ﬁrms that have not issued mandatory convertibles. We test the
predictions of our hypothesis H4, which hypothesizes that the long term operating performance of mandatory
convertible issuers should be similar to that of a matched sample of non-issuers (if the securities are issued
in a fully pooling equilibrium), or poorer to that of a matched sample of non-issuers (if the securities are
issued in a partial pooling equilibrium). We study the operating performance in the year of issue (year 0),
two years prior to the oﬀering (years -2, and -1), and two years subsequent to the oﬀering (years +1, and
+2).44
Several additional data restrictions are present on our sample of mandatory convertibles in this part of
the study. We exclude from our sample the ﬁrms with missing data, such as assets, sales, net income, and
operating income, in the ﬁscal year prior to the oﬀering. This reduced our sample of mandatory convertible
issues to 32.45 We follow the matching algorithm suggested by Barber and Lyon (1996), and Loughran
and Ritter (1997) to select the matched control ﬁrms. In the ﬁscal year prior to the issue, i.e., year -1, each
issuing ﬁrm is matched with a Compustat listed non-issuing ﬁrm chosen on the basis of industry, asset size,
and operating income.46 In particular, we match the mandatory convertible issuing ﬁrm to those ﬁrms
43 As an additional robustness check we also classiﬁed the mandatory convertible issuers into four equal groups (quartiles)
based on ZSCR.A g a i n ,w eﬁnd that as ZSCR increases, the announcement eﬀects become less negative and ultimately zero.
The magnitude and signiﬁcance of the announcement eﬀects also follow the same pattern as in panel B of Table 3. Furthermore,
the results of Table 3 and 4 remain unchanged even if we use LEVG as a proxy for bankruptcy probability instead of ZSCR.
44 We also studied the operating performance for two additional years subsequent to the oﬀering (years +3, and +4). We
do not report the results for those two years as our sample size for those two years decreases considerably. Our results for the
operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers for those two years are similar to the results presented here as well.
45 Due to our already restricted sample size, we do not eliminate multiple oﬀerings by the same ﬁrm. However, in results
not reported here we also conducted our operating performance study after eliminating subsequent oﬀerings by the same ﬁrm,
which reduced our sample to 26 mandatory convertible issuers. The results obtained are similar to the ones reported here.
46 Barber and Lyon (1996) suggest matching on prior performance to account for the mean-reversion in accounting ratios.
37that have the same two-digit SIC code and whose asset size lies between 25% and 200% of the issuer in the
year prior to the oﬀering. These matching ﬁrms are then ranked by their year -1 operating income (OIBD)
relative to total assets (AT ). The ﬁrm with the closest OIBD/AT ratio is selected as the matching ﬁrm.47
In our empirical analysis, we measure the operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers, us-
ing the following accounting ratios: proﬁt margin, deﬁned as net income/sales; ROA, deﬁned as net in-
come/assets; OIBD/AT, i.e., (operating income before depreciation + interest income)/assets; and OIBD/SA,
i.e., (operating income before depreciation + interest income)/sales. The results are presented in Table 5.
In panel A and B of table 5, we report the medians of the operating performance measures for issuers and
their matching non-issuers respectively. Our results show that the operating performance are quite similar
between the issuers and the matched non-issuers one year prior to the issue. This provides evidence that
we have achieved fairly precise matches, since our matching ﬁrms are selected based on the asset size and
operating income at year -1.
Panel C of table 5 reports the diﬀerence in the median accounting ratios between the mandatory con-
vertible issuers and the matching non-issuers. For instance, for years 0, 1, and 2, the median diﬀerences in
proﬁt margins between the issuer and non-issuer are 0.78%, 3.44%, and 2.10% respectively, while the median
diﬀerences in ROA are 0.36%, -1.15%, and -1.43% respectively. Panel D of Table 5 reports the Z—statistics
obtained for the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests on the diﬀerence in operating performance be-
tween the mandatory convertible issuers and matched non-issuers from year -2 to year +2. The Z-statistics
suggest that the post-issue operating performance of issuers and non-issuers are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from each other in all the accounting ratios. These results are broadly consistent with our hypothesis H4,
showing that ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles do not underperform a matched sample of non-issuers.48
Candidate matching ﬁrms belong to the universe of Compustat ﬁrms that have never issued a mandatory convertible security.
47 We also require that the matching ﬁrm has not issued any kind of securities within a one-month window of the mandatory
convertible oﬀer date.
48 We are unable to report the results by splitting the sample of mandatory convertible issuers by their ZSCR (bankruptcy
probability) as we did in the case of our analysis of the announcement eﬀect. This is due to a drastic reduction in our sample
size as the ZSCR variable had missing values for a number of issuers. By doing so we would have eﬀectively separated the ﬁrms
issuing the securities in a fully pooling equilibrium from those issuing them in a partial pooling equilibrium. However, even with
the very limited sample we did conduct our analysis of the operating performance after separating the issuers by their by their
value of ZSCR at the time of issuance of the mandatory convertible security. We ﬁnd that throughout the post-issue period
the medians of all the operating performance measures of mandatory convertible issuers having a high ZSCR (low probability
of bankruptcy) are substantially higher than that of issuers having a low ZSCR (high probability of bankruptcy), which is
38Panel E of table 5 reports the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests on the diﬀerence in the post-issue
change of operating performance between the issuer and non-issuer over the post-issue period. The changes
are calculated for three sub-periods measured over ﬁscal years -1 to 0, -1 to +1, and -1 to +2. The results
show that the changes are not statistically signiﬁcant, which is again consistent with our hypothesis H4.49
Note that our model does not have any predictions on the operating performance of mandatory convertible
issuers in the years prior to the issuance of the mandatory convertible. However, it is still interesting to note
that, according to panel D of table 5, mandatory convertible issuers do not underperform non-issuers in the
years prior to the issue. This result indicates that ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles are not those which
have deteriorated in performance prior to the security issue.50
6.5 The Long-Run Stock Performance of Mandatory Convertible Issuers
In this sub-section we present the results of long-run abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible
issuers. Our theoretical model does not have any direct predictions regarding the long-run stock performance
of mandatory convertible issuers. However, as this is the ﬁrst paper on mandatory convertible securities, we
feel that it is important to document the long-run abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible
issuers. We estimate abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers in this paper using (a)
cumulative abnormal returns, and (b) the intercept of the Fama-French time series regression.
6.5.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
We follow Loughran and Ritter (1997) in measuring long-run stock returns. We calculate the abnormal
performance of the mandatory convertible issuers using cumulative abnormal returns from the announcement
day of the issue till the end date of each event window. The matched ﬁrms are selected following the same
algorithm which has been described in the previous sub-section. Stock returns are calculated in event time
generally consistent with H4. However, given the very limited sample size we cannot claim any statistical signiﬁcance for these
results.
49 This is in contrast to operating performance measures of equity issuers and ordinary convertible debt issuers which generally
decline in the post issue period as documented by numerous studies in the literature. For example, for operating performance of
equity issuers see Loughran and Ritter (1997), for operating performance of ordinary convertible issuers see Lee and Loughran
(1998), and Lewis et. al. (2001), and for operating performance of ﬂoating-priced convertibles see Hillion and Vermaelen (2002).
50 This provides an interesting contrast to studies of other kinds of securities (e.g. ﬂoating-price convertibles) which document
a deterioration in ﬁrm performance prior to the security issuance. See, Hillion and Vermaelen (2002) who document this for
ﬂoating-price convertibles.
39and for four diﬀerent event windows; a period of one year prior to the announcement of the issue, and for
each of the three years subsequent to the announcement of the issue. In both panels in Table 6 daily returns
of mandatory convertible issuers and the two benchmarks are compounded over the relevant trading days in
order to calculate the cumulative return for the four diﬀerent event windows.
In Table 6, Panel A compares cumulative average returns for the mandatory convertible issuers and the
CRSP value weighted index.51 In the year prior to the announcement of the issue the issuing ﬁrms signiﬁ-
cantly out-perform the CRSP value weighted index, however in the three years following the announcement
of the issue, the average CARs of the issuing ﬁrms relative to the market index are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero. The mean CARs for the three years are 6.49%, 3.50%, and -4.40% respectively. Panel B of table 6
reports the long-term abnormal return relative to a benchmark of matched non-issuing ﬁrms. It shows that,
for both the year prior to the announcement, and for any event windows during the three years after the
announcement of the issue, the long-term abnormal returns are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Thus
the long run abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers is generally consistent with their
long run operating performance.52
6.5.2 Fama-French three factor regressions
In order to check the robustness of our results on post-issue long term stock performance and to control for
cross-sectional dependence, we also perform an intercept test based on the Fama-French (1993) three factor
model. The following cross-sectional regression is run in each month t:
(Rpt − Rft)=αt + βt (Rmt − Rft)+stSMBt + htHMLt + εpt. (14)
Here, Rpt is the return on the portfolio of mandatory convertible issuers in month t, Rmt−Rft,t h eﬁrst factor,
is the excess return on the market portfolio, calculated as the return on the market index Rmt minus the
51 We also compare the cumulative abnormal average performance of the mandatory convertible issuers relative to the CRSP
equally weighted index. The results are similar to the ones presented here. The abnormal performance of the issuers are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the equally weighted index for the three years following the announcement of the issue.
52 Our results on the long run abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers are substantially diﬀerent from
previous empirical papers in the literature that document the long-run abnormal stock performance of ordinary convertible debt
issuers. Lee and Loughran (1998), Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1999) and Lewis et al. (2001) show that ordinary convertible
debt issuers signiﬁcantly underperform both the CRSP v a l u ew e i g h t e di n d e xa n dam a t c h e ds a m p l eo fc o n t r o lﬁrms in the
years following the announcement of an ordinary convertible debt issue. Hillion and Vermaelen (2002) show that ﬂoating-priced
convertibles underperform the CRSP value weighted and equally weighted indices in the post- issue period.
40return on the risk-free asset Rft in month t.53 The second factor, SMBt, is the return on a zero investment
mimicking portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a large sized ﬁrm portfolio from the return on
as m a l ls i z e dﬁrm portfolio in month t, a n dt h et h i r df a c t o r ,HMLt, is the return on a zero investment
mimicking portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks from the
return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks in month t. In this procedure, the monthly returns of all
ﬁrms in the portfolio of mandatory convertible issuers are aligned in event time t with month 0 representing
the issue announcement month. The intercept of the regression αt is the estimate of the average abnormal
performance in month t.T h e s l o p e c o e ﬃcients βt,s t, and ht measure the sensitivity of the portfolio of
mandatory convertible issuers with respect to each factor. The average abnormal returns are estimated by
averaging the αt’s over the relevant months for each event window.
The results of the Fama-French three factor regressions are presented in Table 7. Panel A reports the
results using the CRSP value weighted index as the market portfolio to calculate Rmt, and Panel B reports
the results using the CRSP equally weighted index as the market portfolio to calculate Rmt. In both panels,
t h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nf o u rd i ﬀerent event windows from 12 months prior to the announcement date
till 36 months after the announcement of the mandatory convertible issue. As can be seen from table 7, the
average abnormal stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
for all the event windows. The average abnormal performance for the ﬁr s t1 2m o n t h ss u b s e q u e n tt ot h ei s s u e
is 0.1%, for the next 12 months it is -0.5%, while for the last 12 months it is 0.3% when using the value
weighted index as the market portfolio. Moreover, these results are invariant to the choice of the equally
weighted or the value weighted index as the market portfolio. Thus, the results here are consistent with our
results of the long run abnormal stock performance found in the previous sub-section with the CAR approach,
and are also consistent with the results on the long run operating performance of mandatory convertible
issuers. Overall, we ﬁnd that, unlike ordinary convertible debt issuers, ﬁrms issuing mandatory convertibles
on average do not experience any long run abnormal stock performance subsequent to the announcement of
53 Since previous literature on the three factor model argues about the appropriateness of using the equally weighted market
portfolio vs. the value weighted market portfolio, we present results using both the equally and value weighted indices. For a
discussion on this issue see Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1999).
41the issues.54
7C o n c l u s i o n
Mandatory convertibles are equity-linked hybrid securities that automatically convert to common stock on a
pre-speciﬁed date, and which have become an increasingly popular means of raising capital in recent years.
In this paper, we have presented the ﬁrst theoretical and empirical analysis of mandatory convertibles in
the literature. We considered a ﬁrm facing a ﬁnancial market characterized by asymmetric information, and
signiﬁcant costs in the event of ﬁnancial distress. The ﬁrm could raise capital either by issuing mandatory
convertibles, or by issuing more conventional securities like straight debt, common stock, and ordinary
convertibles. We showed that, in equilibrium, the ﬁrm issues straight debt, ordinary convertibles, or equity
if the extent of asymmetric information facing it is more severe, but the probability of ﬁnancial distress is
relatively small; it issues mandatory convertibles if it faces a smaller extent of asymmetric information but
a greater probability of being in ﬁnancial distress. Our model provides a rationale for the three commonly
observed features of mandatory convertibles: mandatory conversion, capped (or limited) capital appreciation,
and a higher dividend yield compared to common stock. We also characterized the equilibrium design of
mandatory convertibles. In addition to its implications for the choice of ﬁrms between mandatory convertibles
and other securities, our model also has implications for the abnormal stock returns upon the announcement
of mandatory convertibles, and for the post-issue operating performance of mandatory convertible issuers.
We tested the implications of our theory on a sample of ﬁrms which have chosen to issue either
ordinary or mandatory convertibles, making use of commonly used proxies for asymmetric information (e.g.,
ﬁrm size, the number of analysts following a ﬁrm, standard deviation of analyst forecasts, analyst forecast
error) and the probability of ﬁnancial distress (Altman’s Z-score, ﬁrm leverage at the time of issue). The
evidence is consistent with the implications of our theory. In particular, we ﬁnd that it is indeed ﬁrms
facing a smaller extent of information asymmetry but a larger probability of ﬁnancial distress that issue
54 Again our results of the abnormal performance of a portfolio of mandatory convertible issuers using the Fama-French three
factor model is in contrast to results obtained by previous studies on ordinary convertible debt issuers, where the abnormal re-
turns are signiﬁcantly negative. See Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves (1999) for ordinary convertible bonds, and Hillion and Vermaelen
(2002) for ﬂoating-priced convertibles.
42mandatory convertibles; those facing a larger extent of information asymmetry and a smaller probability
of ﬁnancial distress issue ordinary convertibles. Our empirical evidence also supports the implications of
our theory regarding the announcement eﬀects of mandatory convertible issues and the post-issue operating
performance of mandatory convertible issuers relative to that of a matched sample of non-issuers. We also
document that mandatory convertible issuers do not exhibit long-term negative abnormal stock performance
(in contrast to the negative abnormal long-term stock performance of ordinary convertible issuers that has
been documented in the literature).
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45Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. In this proposition, the type G maximizes ΠG subject to (4), (2), and (3);
t h et y p eMm a x i m i z e sΠM subject to (7), (6), and (5); and the type B maximizes ΠB subject to:
ne[(1 − δ)(1 − φ2)xH +( 1− (1 − δ)(1 − φ2))xL] ≥ I. (A1)
ΠG ≥ ΠG|B =[ ( 1− φ1)xH + φ1xL](1 − ne) (A2)
ΠM ≥ ΠM|B =[ ( 1− δ)(1 − φ1)xH +( 1− (1 − δ)(1 − φ1))xL](1 − ne) (A3)
We ﬁrst derive the conditions in which a fully separating PBE exists, assuming that (4), (7), and (A1)
hold as equalities. In this case, inequality (5) is satisﬁed automatically. From inequality (6), we have
I − xL ≤
φ2(1−φ1)C
φ2−φ1 ;f r o m( 2 ) ,I − xL ≤
[1−(1−δ)(1−φ2)](1−φ1)
(1−φ1)−(1−δ)(1−φ2) C;a n df r o m( 3 ) ,I − xL ≤ (1 − φ1)C.T h u s ,
(6) and (2) are satisﬁed as long as (3) is satisﬁed. Similarly, inequality (A2) is satisﬁed as long as (A3) is
satisﬁed, which we can yield
φ1C ≤
(1 − δ)(φ2 − φ1)(xH − xL)I
VB
,( A 4 )
where VB =( 1− δ)(1 − φ2)xH +[ 1− (1 − δ)(1 − φ2)]xL.
Now we consider the situation where (4), (7), and (A1) do not hold as equality. Consider (1 − φ1)C<
I−xL. Then, (4) cannot be satisﬁed as an equality. In this case, the type G sets Pd to satisfy (3) as an equality,
so that it over-pays investors to discourage the mimic from the type M. When (1 − φ1)C<
φ2−φ1
φ2 (I − xL),
(7) cannot be satisﬁed as an equality as well. In this case, the type M has to overpay investors to discourage
t h em i m i cf r o mt h et y p eB ,a n ds e t snc to satisfy (6) as an equality.
Thus, a separating equilibrium exists satisfying the deﬁnition of a PBE, i.e., part (a) and (b) in the
deﬁnition of equilibrium described in section 3 when (A4) is satisﬁed. In equilibrium, the expected payoﬀ
t ot h et y p eGΠS
G = Min[(1 − φ1)(xH − xL)+xL−I
1−δ +
δ−φ1
1−δ C, (1 − φ1)(xH − xL)+xL − I − φ1C];t h e
expected payoﬀ to the type M ΠS




1−φ2 C, (1 − φ1)(1 −
δ)(xH −xL)+xL −I −φ1C], and the expected payoﬀ to the type M ΠS
B =( 1−φ2)(δxH +δxL)+φ2xL −I.
Alternatively, if the type M issues mandatory convertible to pool with the type B, its expected payoﬀ is
46ΠPP
M (which we will derive in the proof of Proposition 2); if the type M issues debt to pool with the type G,
its expected payoﬀ is Π0
M = Min{(1 − δ)(1 − φ1)(xH − xL) −
(1−δ)(1−φ1)
1−ρ3 (I − xL) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)]C,
(1−φ1)[VB−I+(1−(1−δ)(1−φ2))C]
(1−φ2) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)]C};55 and if the type G issues mandatory convertible
to pool with the type M and type B, its expected payoﬀ is ΠFP
G (which we will derive in the appendix of
Proposition 3). Thus, given C>c 1 ≡
γ1
γ1(1−φ1)+γ2(1−δ)(1−φ1)(I −xL),i fφ1 ≤ φ
0 or a ≥ a00,t h e nΠS
G and ΠS
M
are greater than the corresponding payoﬀs when the other securities is oﬀered. We will show the expressions
of φ
0 and a00 in the proof of Proposition 2.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . In this proof, we will ﬁrst proof the partially pooling equilibrium described
in Proposition 2 satisﬁes part (a) and (b) of our deﬁnition of equilibrium, i.e., the deﬁnition of a PBE. Then,
we will show it satisﬁes part (c) as well.
In this proposition, the type G maximizes ΠG given in (1), subject to (4), and the following IC constraints:
ΠM ≥ ΠM|G =( 1− φ1)(1 − δ)(xH − Pd) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)]C, (A5)
ΠB ≥ ΠB|G =( 1− φ2)(1 − δ)(xH − Pd) − [1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ2)]C,
where Pd =
I−φ1xL
1−φ1 . The type M maximizes ΠM given in (8) and the type B maximizes ΠB =( 1−
nm)φ2(xL − D)+( 1− φ2)(1 − Um
V t=1
MB




2{γ2(1−φ1)[δxH +δxL]+γ3(1−φ2)[δxH +δxL]} and ρ0
2 =
γ3φ2+γ2φ1
γ2+γ3 is the probability of deterioration
at t=1 for the ﬁrm issuing mandatory convertible. In addition, nm, D, Um satisfy (7) and
Um ≥ nmV 1
MB.( A 6 )
First, we assume (7) holds as equality and relax this assumption later in the proof. Thus, if we write (7)
in terms of nm and incorporate it into ΠM,w eh a v e :





















∂Um < 0 and ∂ΠM








M =( 1− δ)(V 0
MB − I)
1−φ1
1−ρ2 where ρ2 =
γ2(1−φ1)δ+γ2φ1+γ3(1−φ2)δ+γ2φ2
γ2+γ3 (ρ2 is the probability
55 This payoﬀ to the type M occurs in the equilibrium when the type M and the type G issue debt to pool while the type B
issues equity. Detail description and the derivation of this equilibirum is available upon the requsest of readers.
47of the ﬁrm issuing the mandatory convertible at t=0 and earning a low cash ﬂow at t=2) and V 0
MB =
ρ2xL +( 1− ρ2)xH (V 0
MB is the expected value at t=0 of the ﬁrm issuing mandatory convertible. In this
case, a partially pooling equilibrium exists when
(1−ρ2)φ1




Now we relax the assumption on (7) we made above. Then, when I −xL ≤
(1−ρ2)φ1
ρ2−φ1 C, (7) cannot hold as
equality, and Pd is set to satisfy (4) as an equality, in which case a partially pooling equilibrium still exists.
Thus, there exist a partially pooling equilibrium satisfying part (a) and (b) of our deﬁnition of equilibrium
when
I − xL <
1 − (1 − δ)(1 − φ1)
(1 − φ1)(1 − δ)(xH − Pd) − Π∗
M
C.( A 8 )
In this case, the payoﬀ to the type G ﬁrm is ΠS
G,a n dt h ep a y o ﬀ to the type M ﬁrm is ΠPP
M ≡ Π∗
M.
Now we the condition under which the type M would not choose equity to pool with the type B. If equity
is issued in the partially pooling equilibrium by the type M and type B, then the expected payoﬀ to the type
M ﬁrm is (1 − I
V 0
MB
)[(1−δ)(1 −φ1)(xH −xL)+xL], which equals ΠM(D =0 ,U m = nmV 1
MB) and less than
ΠPP
M =m a x
D,Um,nm
ΠM.
If the type M issues ordinary convertible, it earns a payoﬀ of ΠS
M. ΠPP
M < ΠS
M when φ1C<[(1 −




I − xL >
φ1(1 − ρ2)(γ2 + γ3)C
(1 − δ)(φ2 − φ1)γ3
.( A 9 )
Under the constraint C>C ,( A 9 )c a nb es a t i s ﬁed only if γ3 ≥ γ ≡
φ1γ1(1−φ1)(1−γ1)
(φ2−φ1)[γ1φ2+γ2(1−δ)(1−φ1)].( A 4 ) i s
satisﬁed as long as (A9) is true since (1 − δ)(V 0
MB − I)
1−φ1
1−ρ2 > [(1 − δ)(1 − φ1)(xH − xL)+xL](1 − ne).





(1−δ)(φ2−φ1)γ3 ),o rw h e n
a ≥ a00 ≡
(1−δ)(φ2−φ1)γ3xH
(1−δ)(φ2−φ1)γ3I−φ1(1−ρ2)(γ2+γ3)C. On the other hand, when φ1 ∈ [φ
0, φ
00] or equivalently when
a ∈ [a0,a 00], a partial pooling equilibrium occurs, where a0 and φ
00 will be deﬁned in the following proof.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . In this proof, we will ﬁrst prove the fully pooling equilibrium satisﬁes the
criteria (a) and (b) in our deﬁnition of equilibrium, and then prove it satisﬁes criterion (c) as well.
If mandatory convertible is issued, then the type G maximizes (11), subject to (12) and








1 is the probability of ﬁrm deteriorating at t=1).
If we write (12) in terms of nm and incorporate it into (11), we have:





















∂Um < 0 and ∂ΠG

















)[(1 − φ1)xH + φ1xL],w h e r eV 0
GMB is the expected ﬁrm value at t=0, V 0
GMB =( 1− ρ1)xH + ρ1xL.
Here, ρ1 is the investors’ belief of a pooling ﬁrm earning a low cash ﬂow at t=2, and ρ1 = γ1φ1 + γ2(1 −




ΠG. If debt is issued in the fully pooling equilibrium, the payoﬀ t ot h et y p eGi s
(1 − φ1)(xH −
I−ρ1xL
1−ρ1 ) − φ1C. If ordinary convertible is issued in the fully pooling equilibrium with call




1)xH )xH −φ1C. It is easy to show that ΠFP
G
is the highest among all the above payoﬀsa sl o n ga sC>0. Thus, the type G prefers to issue mandatory
convertible when pooling with both the type M and the type B ﬁrms.














ρ1−φ1 ),o rw h e na<a 0 ≡
(ρ1−φ1)xH
(ρ1−φ1)I−(1−ρ1)φ1C,
t h et y p eGp r e f e r st oi s s u em a n d a t o r yc o n v e r t i b l et op o o lw i t ht h et y p eMa n dt y p eB .
Proof of Proposition 4. Before time 0, the market value the equity of a pooling ﬁrm at γ1[(1−φ1)xH+
φ1xL]+γ2[(1−φ1)(δxH +δxL)+φ1xL]+γ3[(1−φ2)(δxH +δxL)+φ2xL].I faﬁrm issues debt, the market re-
values the ﬁrm at (1−φ1)xH+φ1xL.I faﬁrm issues equity, the market values it at (1−φ2)(δxH+δxL)+φ2xL.
If a ﬁrm issues ordinary convertible, the market re-values it at (1−φ1)(δxH +δxL)+φ1xL,w h i c hi sg r e a t e r
than the market equity value before time 0 if γ3 < γ ≡ γ1
δ(1−φ1)
(1−δ)(φ2−φ1).
49P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 . Let nm ≤ n, D ≤ dxL. Then following the proof of Proposition 3,
∂ΠG
∂nm > 0 for any given D ≤ xL,a n d∂ΠG
∂D > 0 for any nm ≤ 1.T h u s , n∗












GMB−xL . It is easy to show that
∂U∗
m





Tests of differences in mean and median characteristics of firms issuing ordinary and mandatory convertibles. 
NUMA is the number of analysts, FORERR is the error in analysts’ forecast estimates, STDEV is the standard 
deviation in analysts’ forecasts, COVAR is the coefficient of variation in analysts’ forecasts, FSZE is the firm 
size, defined as Ln(100*(TA+MKVALF-CEQ), MKBK is the market-to-book ratio, defined as (TA+MKVALF- 
CEQ)/TA,  ZSCR is defined as (3.3*EBIT/Sales + 1.0*Sales/TA + 1.4*RE/TA + 1.2*WC/TA + 
0.6*MKVALF/DT), LEVG is firm leverage defined as DT/(TA+MKVALF- CEQ), SYND is a dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if the issue is syndicated and 0 otherwise, and FIN is a dummy variable which takes the 
value of 1 if the issuing firm is a financial firm and 0 otherwise. The results of t-tests for difference in means 
and the Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z-statistic) for the difference in distributions of the characteristics between 
firms issuing ordinary and mandatory convertibles are reported. ***, **, and * denotes significance at the 1, 5, 














Z-Score (ZSCR) Ordinary 153 12.020 3.996
Mandatory 41 3.229 4.156*** 2.342 3.588***
Leverage (LEVG) Ordinary 153 0.194 0.176
Mandatory 41 0.258 -2.710*** 0.243 -3.008***
Number of Analysts (NUMA) Ordinary 153 10.542 9.000
Mandatory 41 17.244 -4.511*** 18.000 -4.476***
Forecast Error (FORERR) Ordinary 153 0.014 0.003
Mandatory 41 0.005 2.980*** 0.002 1.321
Std. Dev. Of Estimate (STDEV) Ordinary 147 0.092 0.030
Mandatory 41 0.085 0.359 0.050 -2.090**
Coeff. Of Variation of Estimate (COVAR) Ordinary 146 0.394 0.047
Mandatory 41 0.208 1.094 0.046 0.273
Firm Size (FSZE) Ordinary 153 7.039 6.925
Mandatory 41 8.600 -7.198*** 8.344 -5.787***
Market to Book Ratio (MKBK) Ordinary 153 1.918 1.529
Mandatory 41 1.413 3.650*** 1.195 3.340***
Syndication Dummy (SYND) Ordinary 153 0.216 0.000
Mandatory 41 0.634 -5.033*** 1.000 -5.159***
Financial Firm (FIN) Ordinary 153 0.007 0.000
Mandatory 41 0.073 -1.598 0.000 -2.660***
Panel A: Univariate comparison of bankruptcy probabilities
Panel B: Univariate comparison of the extent of asymmetric information
Panel C: Univariate comparison of control variables
  51Table 2 
This table reports multinomial logit regressions relating the firm’s choice of the convertible security type to 
various measures of information asymmetry, and the bankruptcy probability. The dependent variable TYPE 
takes the value of 1 if the firm issues a mandatory convertible and 0 if the firm issues an ordinary convertible. 
NUMA is the number of analysts, FORERR is the error in analysts’ forecast estimates, STDEV is the standard 
deviation in analysts’ forecasts, COVAR is the coefficient of variation in analysts’ forecasts, FSZE is the firm 
size, defined as Ln(100*(TA+MKVALF-CEQ), MKBK is the market-to-book ratio, defined as (TA+MKVALF- 
CEQ)/TA,  ZSCR is defined as (3.3*EBIT/Sales + 1.0*Sales/TA + 1.4*RE/TA + 1.2*WC/TA + 
0.6*MKVALF/DT), SYND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the issue is syndicated and 0 otherwise, 
and FIN is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 if the issuing firm is a financial firm and 0 otherwise. 
We introduce the different measures of information asymmetry one at a time in the regressions 1 through 5. In 
regression 6 we incorporate all the measures of information asymmetry together. Due to the high correlation 
between FSZE and NUMA, and due to the fact that FSZE also proxies for information asymmetry, we omit 
FSZE in the second specification. The z-statistics are in parentheses and ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. Z-statistics are calculated using White’s (1980) method. 
Independent Variables Reg 1 Reg 2 Reg 3 Reg 4 Reg 5 Reg 6
Number of Analysts (NUMA) -0.005 0.078 -0.031
(-0.13) (3.31)*** (-0.81)
Forecast Error (FORERR) -33.697 -37.839
(-2.50)** (-2.67)***
Std. Dev. Of Estimate (STDEV)- 2 . 2 3 8
(-1.55)
Coeff. Of Var of Estimate (COVAR) -0.267 -0.269
(-1.93)* (-2.11)**
Z-Score (ZSCR) -0.095 -0.131 -0.121 -0.106 -0.105 -0.131
(-2.03)** (-2.09)** (-1.78)* (-2.01)** (-2.04)** (-1.72)*
Firm Size (FSZE) 0.800 0.748 0.799 0.823 0.939
(3.67)*** (4.97)*** (5.02)*** (5.04)*** (4.08)***
Market to Book Ratio (MKBK) -0.685 -0.421 -0.863 -0.781 -0.707 -0.983
(-1.30) (-0.88) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.29) (-1.41)
Syndication Dummy (SYND) 1.300 1.495 1.359 1.203 1.318 1.462
(2.86)*** (3.55)*** (2.83)*** (2.63)*** (2.81)*** (2.90)***
Financial Firm (FIN) 5.593 5.790 6.237 5.810 5.857 6.506
(3.82)*** (3.10)*** (3.02)*** (3.58)*** (3.74)*** (2.83)***
Constant -6.633 -1.828 -5.634 -6.240 -6.710 -6.398
(-4.73)*** (-2.52)** (-4.16)*** (-4.97)*** (-5.16)*** (-4.06)***
No. of observations 194 194 194 188 187 187
Wald Chi
2 45.64*** 29.00*** 44.29*** 43.76*** 43.01*** 42.28***
Pseudo R
2 0.351 0.280 0.384 0.352 0.363 0.401
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This table reports the abnormal returns upon announcement of mandatory convertible issues. The abnormal 
returns are reported for five different event windows around the announcement date (day 0) of the security 
issue. In Panel A, mandatory convertible issuers are separated into two groups based on the median value of Z-
Score (ZSCR), whereas in Panel B the firms are separated into three equal groups based on the value of ZSCR. 
For each category of firms and for each event window the cumulative abnormal returns are then tested for 
significant differences from zero (t-statistics in parentheses). In addition, t-statistics for the difference in 
abnormal returns between the high and low ZSCR samples of mandatory convertible issuers are also reported. 
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level respectively. 
 
PANEL A 
Firms Issuing Mandatory Convertibles 
Event Window 
All High  ZSCR Low  ZSCR 
t-statistics (difference 
between high and low 
ZSCR samples) 
              
[0] -0.007  -0.006  -0.009  (0.35) 
   (-2.22)**  (-0.80)  (-4.20)***    
[-1, 0]  -0.004  0.004  -0.012  (2.21)** 
   (-1.26)  (0.60)  (-4.20)***    
[-1, +1]  -0.004  0.005  -0.017  (1.94)* 
   (-1.03)  (0.51)  (-4.26)***    
[-3, 0]  -0.001  -0.001  -0.006  (0.58) 
   (-0.35)  (-0.14)  (-1.01)    
[-3, +3]  -0.004  0.006  -0.029  (1.82)* 




Firms Issuing Mandatory Convertibles 
Event Window 
High ZSCR Medium  ZSCR Low  ZSCR 
t-statistics (difference 
between high and low 
ZSCR samples) 
              
[0]  -0.008 -0.007 -0.009  (0.12) 
   (-0.66)  (-2.40)**  (-2.95)**    
[-1, 0]  0.005  -0.004  -0.014  (1.79)* 
   (0.53)  (-0.97)  (-3.31)***    
[-1, +1]  0.011  -0.016  -0.013  (1.49) 
   (0.75)  (-2.60)**  (-2.73)**    
[-3,  0]  -0.002 -0.001 -0.006  (0.37) 
   (-0.25)  (-0.22)  (0.43)    
[-3, +3]  0.008  -0.014  -0.028  (1.45) 
   (0.37)  (-0.90)  (-2.96)**    
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This table reports the abnormal returns upon announcement of mandatory convertible issues, excluding 
concurrent equity issuers only (Panel A) and excluding either concurrent debt issuers or concurrent equity 
issuers or both (Panel B). The abnormal returns are reported for five different event windows around the 
announcement date (day 0) of the security issue. In both Panel A and Panel B we also separate the issuers into 
two groups based on the median value of Z-Score (ZSCR). For each category of firms and for each event 
window the cumulative abnormal returns are then tested for significant differences from zero. The t-statistics 
















              
[0] -0.007  -0.012  -0.012  -0.011 
   (-2.22)**  (-3.04)***  (-1.07)  (-3.61)*** 
[-1, 0]  -0.004  -0.009  -0.008  -0.010 
   (-1.26)  (-3.18)***  (-1.00)  (-2.96)*** 
[-1, +1]  -0.004  -0.013  -0.021  -0.012 
   (-1.03)  (-3.15)***  (-2.38)**  (-3.06)*** 
[-3, 0]  -0.001  -0.005  -0.011  0.001 
   (-0.35)  (-1.60)  (-1.68)  (0.12) 
[-3, +3]  -0.004  -0.015  -0.028  -0.017 
   (-0.54)  (-2.24)**  (-2.31)**  (-2.07)* 









and Debt Issuers 
High Z-Score 
Excluding Concurrent 
Stock and Debt Issuers 
Low Z-Score 
Excluding Concurrent 
Stock and Debt Issuers 
              
[0] -0.007  -0.012  -0.013  -0.011 
   (-2.22)**  (-2.87)***  (-1.15)  (-3.03)** 
[-1, 0]  -0.004  -0.010  -0.011  -0.012 
   (-1.26)  (-3.38)***  (-1.50)  (-2.79)** 
[-1, +1]  -0.004  -0.011  -0.020  -0.012 
   (-1.03)  (-2.51)**  (-2.34)**  (-2.40)** 
[-3, 0]  -0.001  -0.005  -0.011  0.000 
   (-0.35)  (-1.35)  (-1.64)  (-0.00) 
[-3, +3]  -0.004  -0.011  -0.021  -0.020 
   (-0.54)  (-1.59)  (-1.65)  (-2.21)** 
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This table reports the operating performance of firms in the years prior to and after a mandatory convertible 
issue. Panel A reports median ratios for the issuing firms from 2 years prior to the issue year until 2 years 
afterwards. Panel B reports the same ratios for the non-issuing matching firms. Matching non-issuing firms are 
chosen by matching each issuing firm with a firm that has not ever issued mandatory convertibles, and that has 
not issued any security within a one month window of the issue date using the following algorithm. The non-
issuer had to be in the same two-digit industry with end-of-year -1 assets within 25% to 200% of the issuing 
firm, and then the non-issuer with the closest operating income before depreciation, amortization, and taxes, 
plus interest income was chosen. The data items used to calculate the ratios are Profit margin (net 
income/sales), ROA (net income/assets), OIBD/assets (operating income before depreciation + interest 
income)/assets, OIBD/sales (operating income before depreciation + interest income)/sales, and market-to-book 
ratio (market value of equity/book value of equity). Panel C reports the difference in the medians between the 
mandatory convertible issuers and the matching non-issuers. Panel D tests whether in a given year the 
distribution of these ratios is significantly different for issuers and non-issuers. Panel E tests whether, in a 
specific period relative to the pre-issue year, the change in the distribution of these ratios is significantly 
different between issuers and non-issuers. Z-statistics are reported from the Wilcoxon matched pairs Signed-





Profit Margin  ROA  OIBD/Assets  OIBD/Sales  Number of 
Firms 
Panel A: Issuer Medians 
-2 5.39%  2.90%  9.04%  14.02%  28 
-1 4.79%  2.71%  8.37%  15.99%  32 
0 4.28%  1.66%  7.75%  13.83%  29 
1 6.45%  1.79%  9.91%  14.30%  25 
2 6.93%  2.34%  8.80%  17.56%  23 
Panel B: Non-Issuer Medians 
-2 5.16%  2.43%  8.44%  17.65%  28 
-1 4.87%  2.83%  8.76%  13.31%  32 
0 3.50%  1.30%  7.35%  10.86%  29 
1 3.00%  2.94%  9.83%  12.16%  25 
2 4.84%  3.76%  10.45%  15.47%  23 
Panel C: Difference in Medians Between the Issuers and Matching Non-Issuers  
-2 0.23%  0.47%  0.60%  -3.64%  28 
-1 -0.08%  -0.12%  -0.39%  2.69%  32 
0 0.78%  0.36%  0.39%  2.97%  29 
1 3.44%  -1.15%  0.08%  2.14%  25 
2 2.10%  -1.43%  -1.65%  2.09%  23 
Panel D: Z-statistics Testing the Yearly Equality of Distributions Between the Issuers and Matching 
Non-Issuers Using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
-2 -0.330  0.649  0.928  -0.837  28 
-1 -0.323  0.049  -0.382  -0.402  32 
0 -0.171  -0.057  -0.377  -1.077  29 
1  -0.672 -0.815 0.262 -0.916  25 
2 -0.747  -1.495  -0.436  -1.134  23 
Panel E: Z-statistics Testing the Equality of Distributions Between the Change in the Ratios from the 
Pre-Issue Year to Various Years After the Issue Using the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed-Ranks Test 
Year -1 to 0  -0.057  -0.604  -0.996  -0.027  29 
Year -1 to +1  -0.986  -1.072  -0.262  0.131  25 
Year -1 to +2  -1.235  -1.040  -0.523  -0.089  23 
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This table reports the long run stock performance of mandatory convertible issuers relative to the CRSP value 
weighted index and matched non-issuers for four different event windows. In Panel A cumulative average 
returns are calculated for mandatory convertible issuers, and the value-weighted market index. In Panel B 
cumulative average returns are calculated for mandatory convertible issuers, and matching non-issuers. 
Matching non-issuer firms are chosen on the basis of industry, size and OIBD/AT ratio using the same algorithm 
described in Table 5. In each panel the cumulative average returns are calculated for four different event 
windows; for a period of one year prior to the announcement date, for a period of one year after the 
announcement date, for a period of two years after the announcement date, and for a period of three years after 
the announcement date. For each category of firms the cumulative average returns are calculated by 
compounding the daily returns of firms over the relevant trading days in each event window, and then 
calculating the average for that particular event window. Cumulative abnormal average returns are then 
calculated for each event window and t-statistics are calculated to test if the cumulative abnormal average 






Panel A: Cumulative returns by event years for Mandatory Convertible Issuers and the CRSP value-weighted 
index 
  
Year Prior to 
Issue 
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Mandatory  Conv.  Issuers  31.94% 18.48% 31.69%  39.81% 
VW - Index  18.06%  12.00%  28.18%  44.20% 
Average Abnormal Return  13.88%  6.49%  3.50%  -4.40% 
t- statistics  2.90*** 1.03  0.36  -0.34 
Sample  Size  65 56 54  44 
Panel B: Cumulative returns by event years for Mandatory Convertible Issuers and an Industry-Size Matched 
sample 
  
Year Prior to 
Issue 
Year 1  Year 2  Year 3 
Mandatory  Conv.  Issuers  22.14% 21.52% 17.68% 1.33% 
Matched  Non-Issuers  13.36% 9.30% 27.45%  22.17% 
Average Abnormal Return  8.79%  12.22%  -9.77%  -20.83% 
t- statistics  0.67 1.09 -0.55  -1.11 
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This table reports time series regressions of monthly returns of mandatory convertible issuers using the Fama-
French (1993) three-factor model. The monthly returns are aligned in event time with month 0 representing the 
issue announcement month. The cross-sectional regression:  
( ) ( ) , pt t t t t ft mt t t ft pt HML h SMB s R R R R ε β α + + + − + = −  
is run in each month t. Rpt is the return on the portfolio of mandatory convertible issuers in month t; Rmt is the 
return on the market index in month t; Rft is the return on the risk-free asset in month t; SMBt is the return on 
small firms minus the return on large firms in month t; and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks 
minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t. The factor definitions are described in Fama and 
French (1993). The intercept of the regression αt is an estimate of the average abnormal performance in month t. 
The number of firms in the portfolio of mandatory convertible issuers ranges from 44 to 69, with multiple issues 
by the same firm being excluded from the regressions. In Panel A the three-factor model is run by using the 
CRSP value-weighted index as the market index, whereas in Panel B the CRSP equally-weighted index is used 
as the market index. In both panels the results are presented for four different event windows from 12 months 
prior to the announcement date till 36 months after the announcement of the mandatory convertible issue. The t-
statistics are presented in parenthesis and are calculated using the time series standard deviation of the average 




Panel A: Average annual abnormal returns and sensitivities to Fama-French factors using the three factor 
model and the value weighted index 
   Months -12 to -1  Months 0 to 12  Months 13 to 24  Months 25 to 36 
Alpha  0.007 0.001 -0.005 0.003 
   (0.60) (0.05) (-0.32) (0.15) 
Market Index  1.234  1.334  1.375  1.098 
   (2.63)*** (2.07)**  (2.55)***  (2.14)** 
SMB portfolio  0.386  0.177  0.272  0.170 
   (0.53) (0.53)  (0.66)  (0.21) 
HML portfolio  0.477  0.831  0.961  0.660 
   (0.65) (1.45)  (2.05)**  (0.92) 
R
2
adj  0.212 0.203  0.177  0.160 
Panel B: Average annual abnormal returns and sensitivities to Fama-French factors using the three factor 
model and the equally weighted index 
   Months -12 to -1  Months 0 to 12  Months 13 to 24  Months 25 to 36 
Alpha  0.012 0.007 -0.001 0.005 
   (1.18) (0.36) (-0.03) (0.24) 
Market Index  0.790  0.990  0.964  0.620 
   (1.41) (1.51)  (1.65) (0.91)* 
SMB portfolio  -0.275  -0.276  -0.365  -0.191 
   (-0.38) (-0.52)  (-0.63)  (-0.23) 
HML portfolio  0.006  0.510  0.515  0.281 
   (0.01) (1.03)  (1.13)  (0.41) 
R
2
adj  0.165 0.160  0.130  0.133 
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